By Victoria Panfilova, an NG commentator, exclusively for Vestnik Kavkaza
Offers from Brussels and Moscow to the ex-Soviet republics to choose between the European and Customs Unions has put them between a rock and a hard place. The choice of one of the unions aggravates relations with the other. The EU seems more loyal, giving time and chances to members of the Eastern Partnership to think, study all the pros and cons and make a choice. If they fail at the Vilnius summit, they can try again in the future. Russia is harsher: either the Customs Union or be aggrieved for your own choice.
They seem to forget that the Eastern Partnership was initiated by Poland and Sweden, with the US standing behind them, not the EU. The European Union had enough problems with Greece and its suddenly shattering hopes around Ireland. Irreversible problems could be seen in the traditionally problematic states of southern countries of the continent. Washington’s will to see the EU strong does not always seem honest. Although its desire, even though discreet, to weaken influence of Russia is always honest. This is why Russian uncompromising approach in the said issue and flexibility of the EU appear quite understandable.
Six members of the Eastern Partnership can be geographically split into western (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova) and southern (South Caucasus states). The Vilnius summit outlined a more cloudy fate for the ‘western triplets’ than the ‘eastern.’ Predicting the outcome of the Ukrainian crisis is complicated. Some Ukrainian political analysts believe that even schism of the Ukrainian state is possible. So this problem provokes more concerns about integrity of Ukraine than its foreign political goals.
The situation with Belarus is also unclear. There are periods when Brussels forgets about the Belarusian president, ‘the last dictator in Europe," and his manner of rule and starts liberalizing relations with Minsk. But the exceptional firmness of Alexander Lukashenko in relations with allies hinders the process. Lukashenko ends up faithful to Moscow in his attempts to make the best dividends from Russia and the West, although he understands that it would be hard to withstand pressure from the West without the help of Russia. Belarus and Ukraine signed nothing in Vilnius but the EU has not slammed the door for them, though Belarus is a member of the Customs Union.
Moldova initialed the association agreement to implement the free trade and visa-free regime for long periods. The Document needs ratifying by the parliament of Moldova, most members of which are communists with their own vision of the future. New parliamentary polls are coming. The Communist Party may achieve the constitutional majority again in 2014.
The ‘southern triplet’ is a lot more predictable. Azerbaijan took quite a passive position in the Eastern Partnership from the very start. The self-sufficient state can talk with the EU as an equal actor and set priorities of cooperation, with account of Europe’s need for hydrocarbons. Simplification of the visa regime was the priority for the Vilnius summit. Brussels agreed and Baku probably needed nothing else. The Karabakh problem is evidently limiting opportunities for political maneuvers of Azerbaijan and closer cooperation with the EU, considering that the Customs Union and other Russian integration projects are of little interest to the republic, could cause certain annoyance in Moscow. This is of no interest to Baku.
The scenario of Armenia was easy to figure out. The association agreement, individual for every member of the Eastern Partnership, offered Armenia a free trade zone, simplification of the visa regime in exchange for reforms of administration and legislature to harmonize them with European standards. The political and military aspect were totally excluded, giving hopes that Moscow will not be challenged by choice of a strategic Trans-Caucasus partner. It was clear that in the situation Armenia was in, deprived of chances to make a political maneuver because of the Karabakh problem and in great economic dependence, it had no choice.
Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan said at a recent visit to Moscow that Armenia wanted to join the Customs Union. Such sudden u-turn triggered minor grievances and disappointment of the pro-Western part of the society. But the recent polls of Gallup ‘legitimized’ the president’s choice. About 70% of the population speak for the Customs Union. In Vilnius, worried about the predictable u-turn of Armenia, Europe was trying to both ‘save its face’ and the partner by signing a blurred memorandum and making declarations about plans to develop relations. Relations will probably progress but Armenia, as presupposed, stays in the geopolitical zone of Russian influence. Arrival of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Yerevan on November 2 will only put a logical end at this stage of the story.
Georgia, as expected, initialed the agreement, continuing to drift in the European direction. The visual dividends Georgia achieved are cheaper EU visas, though Georgians cannot receive them fast. Rapprochement continues. Obviously, some pressure from Moscow will grow. How will it all turn out at a pinch? This may result in a new trade embargo or complications in former Georgian autonomies Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Access to the breakaway republics will be even harder, construction of border barriers will continue deeper on the Georgian territory. But it seems that Georgia is unimaginably far from joining the EU, unless a political decision will be made for it, the way it was made for Bulgaria, despite its inability to meet the criteria. No security guarantees can be given to Georgia. This makes its foreign political vector irreversible.
