Viktoria Panfilova, observer of Nezavisimaya Gazeta, exclusively to Vestnik Kavkaza
Several significant decisions were made at the session of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, where the presidents of the member countries of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space gathered – Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The decisions enable us to predict the future development of the organization. Some contradictions between the sides were discovered, and Vladimir Putin, Nursultan Nazarbayev and Alexander Lukashenko will have to solve them quickly. Different approaches to the CU became clear as well.
The Russian leader stands for quick enhancement of the organization. Of course, he is ready to consider the recommendations and interests of the partners. But he wants to fulfil them along the path without putting a dot or elision marks at any stage. At the same time, Lukashenko and to a larger extent Nazarbayev would like to eliminate all the disadvantages in the CU before it starts working to the full extent.
The view on the CU structure of the Belarus and Kazakhstan leaders is also different. But both of them are most worried about the possible dictat of Russia, as they don’t want to pale into insignificance. Therefore, Lukashenko suggest signing an agreement on the international status of the organization and a definition of the union and its participants’ abilities.
Nazarbayev’s position is more cautious. First of all, he is strictly against politicization of the organization, as he sees it as a union of equal states. Secondly, he believes that cooperation inside the CU shouldn’t reflect on relations between the organization members and third countries. Finally, he is against enhancement of the supranational structure’s functions – the Supreme Council. As always, Nazarbayev emphasized that there was no need for quick enlargement of the CU itself.
The Kazakh leader doesn’t want to see new members in the alliance at this stage not only due to his position that “the alliance should start working first and then we’ll see who should be invited into it.” Nazarbayev is very concerned with Armenia’s joining the CU because of the unsettled Karabakh conflict. His doubts about Armenia are practical – the point is in its borders. Nazarbayev appreciates his relations with Azerbaijan, as Kazakhstan and Baku have joint energy projects and projects on the Caspian Sea. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are members of the alliance of Turkic Speaking States, and Astana sees great potential in it. Finally, the most important thing is that Azerbaijan is one of the paths to Europe for Kazakhstan, and it would be the only path if any problems appeared with Russia. Although it is unlikely, Astana is working on the option as well.
As for the advantages from Armenia’s membership of the CU, in comparison with a worsening of relations with Azerbaijan there are none for Kazakhstan. The Armenian market is small and limited, while Armenian exports are not significant for huge Kazakhstan. Astana’s agreement to the integration of Yerevan is a curtsey to Moscow, which made its Transcaucasia partner choose between integration with the CU and the EU. At the same time, Russia promised Armenia to provide effective membership in the Customs Union. And Kazakhstan agreed to this, stressing its right to a special position toward Armenia.
Therefore, the question on Armenia’s membership in the CU was resolved positively – the road map of integration of the country into the organization was signed in Moscow. A similar document will be signed with Kyrgyzstan in May 2014. But there are differences between them.
Unlike Armenia, which is joining the CU under the direct control of Moscow and gets certain benefits, Bishkek only tries to get them for its agreement to join the CU. Kyrgyzstan tries to gain a status of a free trade zone for its three major markets; benefits for 2,600 items for 10 years; it also wants to sign agreements on establishing labour-intensive manufacturers and free movement of labour migrants. From time to time, Bishkek makes statements about attractive economic and energy projects which are proposed to it by China in exchange for rejecting CU integration. And it is true.
Washington also indirectly hinted to Bishkek that it should reject the CU. While for Beijing economic interests are the most important, Washington provides the well-known course on limitation of Moscow’s geopolitical interests and influence. If Kyrgyzstan rejects Eurasian integration, Tajikistan will do the same or at least it will limit Moscow’s influence in Dushanbe significantly. At the same time, if Kyrgyzstan joins the CU, the question of Tajikistan’s membership will be settled, as the Customs Union will come directly to Tajik borders in case of Kyrgyzstan’s membership.
And finally Ukraine is a special case. Its Premier Mikolai Azarov took part in the session in Moscow as an observer. Kiev has frozen integration with the EU and got a beneficial credit from Moscow and low gas prices. Now it has begun to think over the prospects of the CU. However, there are many unclear aspects in the question of the membership of Ukraine. Some experts think that when Ukraine has spent the Russian money, it will begin to flirt with Europe again, and the result will be unpredictable.
Therefore, we can say that the CU enters 2014 in the following way: 3 (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan) +1 (Armenia) +1 (Kyrgyzstan) +1 (?)
