Russia and Abkhazia continue to discuss the draft treaty on alliance and integration, involving the creation of a common security and defense sphere, as well as cooperation of the two countries in the economic and social spheres. The other day an Abkhaz version of the document was presented to the parliament. Discussions on the issue and prospects of integration are discussed in an interview with an analyst, deputy director of the Center for the Study of Post-Soviet space at MSU, Alexander Karavayev.-To what extent is Russia ready to finance the modernization of Abkhazia? -Despite the difficult position of Russia, it continues to fund Abkhazia to the extent it used to. Since 2009, Moscow has sent Sukhumi slightly less than 30 billion rubles. This year it sent 5.4 billion rubles in total, although we had planned to send around 3 billion. We plan to send 4.5 to 5 billion rubles in the next year. Investment directions are changing, a number of projects have ended and money is being redistributed from construction to other industries. At the same time, the agreement will allow Russia to be involved in Abkhazia not only as an investor but also as a developer. Each agency engaged in its development depending on its expertise will be able to invest in infrastructure and equipment facilities in the spheres of public health, education, customs and internal affairs.-Not everyone in Abkhazia agrees with the customs regulation...-With the customs everything is clear. Statements like "we are being deprived of our customs services" are based on a lack of understanding of the experiences and practices developed in the framework of existing agreements on the Customs Union. Each country - Kazakhstan and Belarus - has their own customs. However, there are regular observers of the Federal Customs Service (FCS) of Russia present at their external borders. This is the subject of the contract, it is not very well spelled out. The FCS also gets the opportunity to invest in infrastructure, including temporary storage facilities at terminals and ports, if necessary. The draft agreement recently discussed in the parliament of Abkhazia acknowledges Sukhumi as the master of customs. -Perhaps this should have been spelled out at the very beginning to avoid controversy? The Russian version of the agreement focuses on development measures. Their realization will be described in sectoral agreements, which it is planned will be concluded during work on the framework agreement. We are currently defining the scope of integration, and we will fill it with content afterwards. This is normal concerning such agreements. Perhaps it would have been good to state the need to protect the interests of Abkhazia in the Customs Union and the Eurasian Union more clearly. The draft agreement currently states Russia's intention to lobby for the international recognition of Abkhazia. But it seems important to me to define this issue and the need for an evaluation of the issue by Russian strategic allies on Eurasian integration in the long run. The Abkhaz draft version is based on it. It is clear that the recognition issue will not be solved quickly, but this will allow tensions to be released. This would be an indication of a clear path. This could be a political statement made by Russia about its willingness to facilitate Abkhazia's integration into the international structures of Eurasian integration. -You have already touched upon the Abkhaz version of the contract, which was recently discussed in the parliament. Are there any significant differences? -As I've said, there is a difference in emphases. The Abkhaz version is an agreement on strategic partnership and alliance, the Russian version is about alliance and integration. In other words, Sukhumi indicates the need to keep a distance and emphasizes this point with different words. For example, the Russian version talks about having a "coherent" foreign policy, the Abkhazian version talks about "coordinated" foreign policy. The difference does not seem that big at first, but it is substantial for Sukhumi. I cannot say, however, that these terminological differences are present in the content part. There are differences regarding the time framework of the implementation of certain provisions. Most of them are expected to take place in half a year, some will be earlier. The issue of joint defense is more elaborated in the Abkhazian version. Sukhumi proposes documenting the need to equip the Abkhaz armed forces with modern weapons. There is an article on support of the Abkhaz language. There are a number of other points that need to be discussed separately, but they are not significant obstacles. -Abkhazia now often refers to the interstate treaty on friendship and cooperation signed in 2008. People say that it already provides a framework for cooperation. They ask why we need a new one. -If you look at the agreements between Russia and other countries, such as Kazakhstan, Belarus and partners from outside the post-Soviet space, you'll see that they are changing every 5 to 12 years. This is the norm in international relations. One agreement was good, but now there is another following it. One page of interaction is over, another one begins and we are entering a new level of cooperation. -In the end, how far can integration of Russia and Abkhazia go? Could it end in a merger?-It is meaningless for Russia to integrate Abkhazia as a subject of the Russian Federation, since it will carry very high international risks. I can give you two deadlock issues that could arise in the case of such development. How will Russia build its relationships with its international partners, primarily with Europe, given the current toughening of sanctions? Moreover, why would the Kremlin eliminate the responsibility of the Abkhazian elite to control the political situation and develop Abkhazia? It is clear that many are afraid and refer to the Crimean case as a precedent. But Crimea was a unique story, just like any other story. Crimea has been historically associated with Russian culture, Russian social and economic life and politics. Abkhazia is not Russia. A decision on Abkhazia's accession will not find as much mass support among the population as the accession of Crimea. Crimea is an issue of national interests. The accession of Abkhazia interests some of the North Caucasian elites. Abkhazia is not Russian land, but it is a country that requires protection and is ready to be covered with the integration umbrella of Russia. Integration and merging are two different things. Therefore, creating a new federal subject is irrational and even dangerous for Russia. Rather, such a balance of powers will be beneficial for the Abkhazian elite, since the borders for their economic activities will be opening. From the political point of view, such relations are in the past for them as well.Merkel personally hammered the last "nail" in the political career of Kohl in 2000, having compelled him to resign from the post of Honorary Chairman of party. After that, as we know, she triumphantly declared to a journalist: "Well, admit it! You didn't think that I would be able to take the honorary presidency from him!" At the same time, she positions herself as a person of her word and honor. Despite the threat of prosecution, he flatly refused to tell the names of the people making contributions to the CDU in cash: "I pledged my word to these people and I won't violate it." And Kohl did indeed keep his word.This was possible precisely because Helmut Kohl belongs to a generation of politicians of historic scale to whom their pledges matter. To a certain degree he understands the tough response of Moscow to the geopolitical games which are developing round Ukraine. The ex-chancellor thoroughly knows about the promise not to expand NATO to the east, after which the GDR was released from the "Warsaw Pact."However, the instance that Kohl still considers to be low treachery is seen by Merkel as care for the future of her party, which appeared at the center of the row at that time because of the financial machinations of the ex-chancellor. But it is obvious that Helmut Kohl can't forgive Frau Merkel. A few weeks ago the fastidious comments about the current chancellor made by Kohl in the 2000s in conversation with the journalist Heribert Schwan were leaked to the German press: "Frau Merkel couldn't even use a knife and fork properly. She loitered at state dinners so that I had to repeatedly tell her to pull herself together," the retired politician said at the time.
Russia and Abkhazia continue to discuss the draft treaty on alliance and integration, involving the creation of a common security and defense sphere, as well as cooperation of the two countries in the economic and social spheres. The other day an Abkhaz version of the document was presented to the parliament. Discussions on the issue and prospects of integration are discussed in an interview with an analyst, deputy director of the Center for the Study of Post-Soviet space at MSU, Alexander Karavayev.
-To what extent is Russia ready to finance the modernization of Abkhazia?
-Despite the difficult position of Russia, it continues to fund Abkhazia to the extent it used to. Since 2009, Moscow has sent Sukhumi slightly less than 30 billion rubles. This year it sent 5.4 billion rubles in total, although we had planned to send around 3 billion. We plan to send 4.5 to 5 billion rubles in the next year. Investment directions are changing, a number of projects have ended and money is being redistributed from construction to other industries.
At the same time, the agreement will allow Russia to be involved in Abkhazia not only as an investor but also as a developer. Each agency engaged in its development depending on its expertise will be able to invest in infrastructure and equipment facilities in the spheres of public health, education, customs and internal affairs.
-Not everyone in Abkhazia agrees with the customs regulation...
-With the customs everything is clear. Statements like "we are being deprived of our customs services" are based on a lack of understanding of the experiences and practices developed in the framework of existing agreements on the Customs Union. Each country - Kazakhstan and Belarus - has their own customs. However, there are regular observers of the Federal Customs Service (FCS) of Russia present at their external borders. This is the subject of the contract, it is not very well spelled out. The FCS also gets the opportunity to invest in infrastructure, including temporary storage facilities at terminals and ports, if necessary. The draft agreement recently discussed in the parliament of Abkhazia acknowledges Sukhumi as the master of customs.
-Perhaps this should have been spelled out at the very beginning to avoid controversy?
The Russian version of the agreement focuses on development measures. Their realization will be described in sectoral agreements, which it is planned will be concluded during work on the framework agreement. We are currently defining the scope of integration, and we will fill it with content afterwards. This is normal concerning such agreements.
Perhaps it would have been good to state the need to protect the interests of Abkhazia in the Customs Union and the Eurasian Union more clearly. The draft agreement currently states Russia's intention to lobby for the international recognition of Abkhazia. But it seems important to me to define this issue and the need for an evaluation of the issue by Russian strategic allies on Eurasian integration in the long run. The Abkhaz draft version is based on it. It is clear that the recognition issue will not be solved quickly, but this will allow tensions to be released. This would be an indication of a clear path. This could be a political statement made by Russia about its willingness to facilitate Abkhazia's integration into the international structures of Eurasian integration.
