Russia and Abkhazia continue discussions of the draft treaty on alliance and integration, stipulating formation of a common defense and security space, and rapprochement in the economic and the social sectors. The Abkhaz variant of the treaty has recently been presented to the parliament. Alexander Karavayev, a politologist, deputy director general of the Center for Studies of the Post-Soviet Space of the MSU IAC, has described the discussions and prospects of integration in an interview with Vestnik Kavkaza.
- You have already mentioned the Abkhaz variant of the treaty that was recently discussed in the parliament. Is there any big difference between the variants?
- The difference is in accents. The Abkhaz variant is a treaty on alliance and strategic partnership, the Russian is on alliance and integration. In other words, Sukhumi points out the need to maintain a distance, which is outlined by different terms. For example, the Russian variant is about carrying out a “concerted” foreign policy, the Abkhaz is about “coordinated.” The difference is aurally insignificant, but it may be essential for Sukhumi. But I would say that such a terminological difference has affected the informatory part. The difference in all the terms of implementation of certain provisions is that most points were postponed by half a year, and, on the contrary, shortened in others. The Abkhaz variant extends and details the positions of joint defenses. Sukhumi proposes establishing the need to equip its armed forces with modern weapons. An extra article was added on support for the Abkhaz language. There are other provisions that need special discussion, but they are not critical problems.
- Abkhazia often recalls our 2008 interstate treaty on friendship and cooperation in the context that it gives all sides opportunities for development of cooperation. And it asks why a new one is needed.
- If we look at the agreements between Russia and other countries – Kazakhstan, Belarus, partners beyond the post-Soviet space – they change around every 5-12 years. This is a norm of international life. The treaty was good, this one goes for its development. One stage of cooperation has ended, another one is starting, we enter a new level of cooperation.
- How far can Russia and Abkhazia go in the end, could they end up fully fused together?
- Integration of Abkhazia as a region of the federation is pointless for Russia and has extremely high risks in the international context. I can name two gridlock issues that arise in case of such a step. How would Russia develop relations with world partners, especially in Europe, considering the current level of “sanction” aggravations? Besides, what is the point of the Kremlin freeing the Abkhaz elite from their responsibility for the political situation and for the domestic development of Abkhazia? It is clear that many fear and point to the Crimean case as an alleged precedent. But the situation with Crimea is unique, as are any others. The Crimean Region has been historically attached to Russia by culture, socio-economic life and politics. Abkhazia is not Russia. A decision to adjoin Abkhazia would not find a response from the population analogous to the case with Crimea. The problem of Crimea is a common national interest, the benefits from adjoining Abkhazia would most likely be in the zone of interests of part of the North Caucasus elites. Abkhazia is not Russian land, but it is a country that needs protection and is ready to go under the integration dome of Russia. Integration and fusion are different things. That is why such an extra burden as the formation of a new region of the federation is irrational and even dangerous. Such developments would be more beneficial for the Abkhaz elite, considering that the boundaries of their freedom for business activities are not narrowed at all, but, in terms of the current policy, of course, such a setup of our relations would be a turned page for them.
Integrating Abkhazia as a region of Russia is pointlessRussia and Abkhazia continue discussions of the draft treaty on alliance and integration, stipulating formation of a common defense and security space, and rapprochement in the economic and the social sectors. The Abkhaz variant of the treaty has recently been presented to the parliament. Alexander Karavayev, a politologist, deputy director general of the Center for Studies of the Post-Soviet Space of the MSU IAC, has described the discussions and prospects of integration in an interview with Vestnik Kavkaza.- You have already mentioned the Abkhaz variant of the treaty that was recently discussed in the parliament. Is there any big difference between the variants?- The difference is in accents. The Abkhaz variant is a treaty on alliance and strategic partnership, the Russian is on alliance and integration. In other words, Sukhumi points out the need to maintain a distance, which is outlined by different terms. For example, the Russian variant is about carrying out a “concerted” foreign policy, the Abkhaz is about “coordinated.” The difference is aurally insignificant, but it may be essential for Sukhumi. But I would say that such a terminological difference has affected the informatory part. The difference in all the terms of implementation of certain provisions is that most points were postponed by half a year, and, on the contrary, shortened in others. The Abkhaz variant extends and details the positions of joint defenses. Sukhumi proposes establishing the need to equip its armed forces with modern weapons. An extra article was added on support for the Abkhaz language. There are other provisions that need special discussion, but they are not critical problems.- Abkhazia often recalls our 2008 interstate treaty on friendship and cooperation in the context that it gives all sides opportunities for development of cooperation. And it asks why a new one is needed.- If we look at the agreements between Russia and other countries – Kazakhstan, Belarus, partners beyond the post-Soviet space – they change around every 5-12 years. This is a norm of international life. The treaty was good, this one goes for its development. One stage of cooperation has ended, another one is starting, we enter a new level of cooperation.- How far can Russia and Abkhazia go in the end, could they end up fully fused together?- Integration of Abkhazia as a region of the federation is pointless for Russia and has extremely high risks in the international context. I can name two gridlock issues that arise in case of such a step. How would Russia develop relations with world partners, especially in Europe, considering the current level of “sanction” aggravations? Besides, what is the point of the Kremlin freeing the Abkhaz elite from their responsibility for the political situation and for the domestic development of Abkhazia? It is clear that many fear and point to the Crimean case as an alleged precedent. But the situation with Crimea is unique, as are any others. The Crimean Region has been historically attached to Russia by culture, socio-economic life and politics. Abkhazia is not Russia. A decision to adjoin Abkhazia would not find a response from the population analogous to the case with Crimea. The problem of Crimea is a common national interest, the benefits from adjoining Abkhazia would most likely be in the zone of interests of part of the North Caucasus elites. Abkhazia is not Russian land, but it is a country that needs protection and is ready to go under the integration dome of Russia. Integration and fusion are different things. That is why such an extra burden as the formation of a new region of the federation is irrational and even dangerous. Such developments would be more beneficial for the Abkhaz elite, considering that the boundaries of their freedom for business activities are not narrowed at all, but, in terms of the current policy, of course, such a setup of our relations would be a turned page for t
