A Disputed Genocide: The Armenian Case (I). Genocidal Plans

Guenter Lewy, 2005. Publisher The University of Utah Press

The literature is voluminous on what Armenians call the first genocide of the twentieth century and what most Turks refer to as an instance of intercommunal warfare and a wartime relocation. Yet despite the great outpouring of writing, an acrimonious debate over what actually happened almost one hundred years ago continues unabated. The highly charged historical dispute burdens relations between Turkey and Armenia and increases tensions in a volatile region. It also crops up periodically in other parts of the world, where members of the Armenian diaspora push for recognition of the Armenian genocide by their respective parliaments and the Turkish government threatens retaliation. 

Vestnik Kavkaza publishes chapters from the book by Guenter Lewy "The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: a Disputed Genocide," revealing the essence of the issue.

To this day, the prevailing view of the Armenians is that the deportation of hundreds of thousands of their compatriots in 1915 represented a state-organized plan of annihilation. The Ottoman government, dominated by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), it is argued, used the cover of war in order to fulfill its long-term ideological goals. "The method adopted to transform a plural Ottoman society into a homogeneous Turkish society," writes Richard Hovannisian, "was genocide." More than half of the Armenian population perished, "and the rest were forcibly driven from their ancestral homeland."1 Most defenders of the Armenian position also adhere to the view that plans for the extermination of the Armenian nation had been worked out well before the outbreak of war in 1914 and thus help to prove the element of premeditation. By the time of the Saloniki congress in November 1910, Dadrian has maintained, the central objective of the CUP had become "the forcible homogenizing of Turkey."2 Finally, authors invoke the large number of Armenian deaths—genocidal consequences—as proof that the massacres that took place must have been part of an overall plan to destroy the Armenian people.3  

Turkısh Natıonalısm, Turanısm, And The Role Of Zıya Gökalp  

As noted in the last chapter, some elements of the CUP leadership had been concerned from an early date about the spirit of nationalism growing among the non-Muslim minorities of the empire and gradually had come to embrace a chauvinistic ideology that stressed the dominant role of the Turks—their language, culture, and religion. However, there is only hearsay evidence that this shift included plans for the forcible elimination of the Armenians. 

On August 6, 1910, several weeks before the opening of the Salonika congress, Talaat is supposed to have delivered a secret speech at a CUP strategy meeting in which he rejected the constitutional equality of Muslims and infidels and advocated the use of the army to homogenize the empire. This plan allegedly included the elimination of various troublesome nationalities and was ratified at a secret session of the Saloniki congress. The "projected extermination of the Armenians" writes Dadrian, "was but one phase of a comprehensive plan in which other nationalities, considered to be alien, discordant, and unsettling were to be targeted."4

The sources reporting on these secret proceedings all rely on secondhand information, and none speak specifically of a planned destruction of the Armenian community. The British vice-consul at Monasrir, Arthur B. Geary, is said to have been one of several foreign diplomats who obtained the text of Talaat's secret speech; but, according to his report rendered on August 28, the relevant part of the speech mentioned nothing worse than the needed "task of Ottomanizing the Empire.'"5 

Others claiming knowledge of the secret decisions include Galib Bey, the former director of post and telegraph in Erzurum and a participant at the congress. According to Dadrian, Galib "confided to his close friend Dikran Surabian, a Catholic Armenian and official interpreter at the French Consulate in Erzurum, that these plans 'make one's hair stand on end' (faire dresser les cheveuxsur la tete).'' 

As the main source for this information Dadrian cites the memoirs of Jean Naslian, the bishop of Trebizond.6 However, even pro-Armenian authors such as James 11. Tashjian and Yves Ternon acknowledge that Bishop Naslian's work has numerous errors."7 

Moreover, the chain of transmission for the damaging information is rather lengthy—Galib confiding to Surabian, who presumably told Bishop Naslian. Dadrian is aware of the "limitations and problems" of such sources,8 and most readers probably will regard this as an understatement. 

Ternon, referring to the allegation that the Saloniki congress accepted the idea of the Armenian genocide, writes: "This assumption is not based on any solid proof." 9 The British historian Andrew Mango uses even stronger language: "I know of no evidence to support the assertion that in several secret conferences of the 'Committee of Union and Progress,' held in Salonica from 1910 onward, the elimination of all Armenians was adopted as a central object of Young Turk policy."10 

The allegation that the noted sociologist and educator Ziya Gökalp (18781924) and his espousal of Turanism played an important role in the planning for the extermination of the Armenians has even less factual support, and yet it is often repeated. "What Wagner was to Hitler" writes the historian James Reid, "Gökalp was to Enver Pasha."Gökalp''s theory and its pragmatic application are said to have meant "the eradication'' of all non-Turkish societies in the shrinking Ottoman- Empire."11 According to Stephan II. Astourian, Gökalp embraced a "mystical vision of blood and race" that turned out to be "devastating for the Armenians and many other non-Turks."12 Peter Balakian calls Gökalp "a virulent racist... foreshadowing the leading Nazi propagandists Alfred Rosenberg and Joseph Goebbels."13

Haigazn Kazarian maintains that Gökalp's teachings "set the philosophical base for the eradication of the Armenians," and he  includes Gökalp among the 160 Turks he considers most responsible for the massacres.14 

Such a reading of Gökalp's ideas appears to be strained, not to say outright wrong. 

Gökalp became a member of the CUP's central committee in 1909 and, with justification, has been called "the spiritual father of Turkish nationalism" and "the philosopher of the Atatyurk Revolution." I5 He sought to exalt the Turkish nation and to encourage pride in Turkish culture. In the last stanza of his poem "Turan," published around 1911, Gökalp declared that the fatherland of the Turks was not Turkey but "a vast and eternal land: Turan." The idea of Turan, an ancient Iranian name for the area lying northeast of Persia, was for him a symbol of the cultural unity of all Turkish people. "Turan," Gökalp wrote in his book The Principles of Turkism, "is the great fatherland of all Turks, which was a reality in the past and may be so again in the future." lie believed that the cultural unity of all Turks, once achieved, could serve as the basis for an eventual political unity. The Turkish nation was to be based on "a sharing of education and culture," not on a racial or ethnic group. The Ottomans, by contrast, had traveled the road of imperialism, which was so detrimental to Turkish culture and life." 16 

Practically all interpreters of Gökalp's thought stress that his notion of Turan or Turanism did not involve any expansionist plans. 

Gökalp's nationalism, writes Taha Parla, "rests unequivocally on language and culture. '' Gökalp was "a man of vast humanitarian concerns." Turkish nationalism meant for him "a cultural ideal," "the basis of social solidarity'' as taught by Emile Durkheim. His nationalism "was a non-racist, non-axpansionist, pluralistic nationalism."17 

Gökalp, argues Gotthard Jaschke, interpreted Turanism in an unpolitical manner. Fantasies of a large empire "ran counter to his entire inner nature."18 Niyazi Berkes  tresses that Gökalp never advocated "anti-Western jingoism" or "racism" and that in his later years he even ceased to mention the word "Turan."19 It is true that at the beginning of World War I Gökalp caught up in the general outpouring of patriotism, wrote a poem in which he predicted that the "land of the enemy shall be devastated Turkey shall be enlarged and become Turan." As late as April 1918 Gökalp expressed the hope that the Turks in Russia would produce a leader who would undertake the task of liberating Turan.

However, even Uriel Heyd, who refers to these utterances, acknowledges that Gökalp soon abandoned these calls for a political union of all Turks and emphasized that "the first task was to unite all the Turkish people on the cultural side."20

In any event, one should add that there is a big difference between longing for a revival of Turkish national greatness and encouraging the violent elimination of all ethnic minorities. Dadrian has called Gökalp an advocate of ethnic cleansing, one of the "party chieftains in this exterminatory enterprise,"21 but he provides no substantiation for this accusation other than quoting an ominous-sounding sentence from Uriel Heyd's intellectual biography of Gökalp: "A considerable part of his suggestions were accepted by the Party and carried out by its Government during rhe First World War."22 The same sentence is quoted by Robert Melson, who also seeks to blame Gökalp for supporting genocide.23 But both Dadrian and Melson distort the position of Heyd, who in the sentences preceding the quoted passage makes it quite clear that the suggestions in question were made in the autumn of 1917, well after the Armenian deportations, and concerned religious education, pious foundations, and family law. "As a member of the 
Central Council of the Union and Progress party," Heyd writes, "Gökalp dealt with social, legal and cultural problems. He investigated the history of the Turkish guilds, the development of the dervish orders and the question of minorities, especially of the Armenians."24 Gökalp was a respected advisor on cultural and educational issues, but he never became one of the CUP's policy makers on political matters.25 

After the defeat of Turkey and the armistice of 1918, Gökalp was arrested and brought before a military court set up by the new Turkish government to try the Young Turk leadership. Unlike many of his colleagues, Gökalp, apparently believing that he had not done anything wrong, refused to flee the country and stayed on lecturing at Constantinople University. When he was questioned at the trial about his concept of Turanism he denied that he had espoused it in order to provoke harm to any of Turkey's minorities. These trials and the significance to be attached to their findings are examined in detail in the next chapter.  


In early 1919 a British official in Constantinople obtained several Turkish documents, the most important of which, he explained in a memo that accompanied the documents to the Foreign Office in London, "is believed to be the original draft instructions issued by the Committee of Union and Progress relative to their plan for massacring Armenians. It is known as the Ten Commandments of the Committee of Union and Progress." The documents had been offered to him in return for a large sum of money by a member of the Turkish Department of Security, but he had finally acquired them without payment by promising the Turkish official who had stolen or rescued the documents protection "if in the future he gets into trouble." The "Ten Commandments" were an unsigned and rough draft, but the handwriting was said to be that of Essad Bey, who at the time the document was drafted (December 1914 or January 1915) was one of the confidential secretaries keeping secret archives in the Ministry of the Interior. According to the informant, present at the meeting when this draft was drawn up were several high-ranking CUP officials, including Talaat Pasha, Dr. Behaeddin Sakir, and Dr. Nazim as well as Colonel Sen, the subdirec-tor of the political section of the Ministry of War. The instructions were to be sent to the valh in the different provinces "with instructions to read these orders to them and then return the originals which were to be destroyed."26 

According to Dadrian, the "Ten Commandments" were the product of a series of secret meetings held by top CUP leaders during the early part of World War I. The draft, he argues, was the result of the decision to commit genocide and was meant as an operative plan. "Both the decision and the blueprint reflect the fact that the crime committed against the Armenians was premeditated and the intent was the wholesale extermination of the victims."27 Christopher Walker also relies on this document,28 which, if considered authentic and taken at face value, indeed provides a powerful indictment of the CUP leadership. The text, in the British verbatim (and rather crude) translation, reads as follows:  


(1) Profiting by Art: 3 and 4 of Committee Union and Progress, close all Armenian Societies, and arrest all who worked against Government at any time among them and send them into the provinces such as Bag dad or Mosul, and wipe them out either on the road or there. 

(2) Collect arms. 

(3) Excite Moslem opinion by suitable and special means, in places as Van, Erzeroum, Adana, where as a point of fact the Armenians have already won the hatred of the Moslems, provoke organized massacres as the Russians did at Baku.

(4) Leave all executive [sic] to the people in provinces such as Erzeroum, Van, Mamuret ul Aziz, and Bitlis, and use Military disciplinary forces (i.e. Gendarmerie) ostensibly to stop massacres, while on the contrary in places as Adana, Sivas, Broussa, Ismidt and Smyrna actively help the Moslems with military force.

(5) Apply measures to exterminate all males under 50, priests and teachers, leave girls and children to be Islamized. 

(6) Carry away the families of all who succeed in escaping and apply measures to cut them off from all connection with their native place. 

(7) On the ground that Armenian officials may be spies, expel them and drive them out absolutely from every Government department or post.

(8) Kill off in an appropriate manner all Armenians in the Army—to be left to the military to do.

(9) All actions to begin everywhere simultaneously, and thus leave no time for preparation of defensive measures. 

(10) Pay attention to the strictly confidential nature of these instruc tions, which may not go beyond two or three persons.29 

It appears that British officials in Constantinople in early 1919 regarded the "Ten Commandments" as genuine and hoped that they would help bring to justice those responsible for the Armenian massacres. Yet (as we will see in more detail in chapter 7) when the law officers the Crown a year later were seeking to build a legal case against the Turkish officials whom the British had arrested and taken to Malta, and no use of the "Ten Commandments" and complained that roper evidence was available that would satisfy a British court of. 30 By that time the British authorities in Constantinople also had un co realize that not every alleged secret document floating around genuine. 

A good number of foreign secret service organizations are operating in the Turkish capital, a British officer reported in February 1920  "and all are naturally anxious to obtain original documents or photographs of the same. This state of affairs affords a very large market for salable goods of this description, and has resulted in the regular production of forgeries for the purposes of sale."31 The press, too, was filled with sensational revelations of all kinds. The Armenian newspaper Verchinlour publicized the text of the "Ten Commandments" on March 23, 1919. The article in Verchinlour containing the "Ten Commandments," albeit in a different translation, was forwarded to Washington by American high commissioner Lewis Heck on March 26, 1919. 

Heck commented: "It is not known whether this document is authentic, but it can at least be stated that the instructions therein contained are of a nature which were followed during the deportations."32 

Dadrian invokes the same argument: "Evidence that the procedure described in the Ten Commandments and the other documents was followed during the genocide would support Essad's [in whose handwriting the document is alleged to be] veracity."

He goes on to refer to testimony accepted by one of the Turkish courtsmartial of officials accused of participation in Armenian massacres held in March 1919 by the new Turkish government. This tribunal makes no mention of the "Ten Commandments" but does make reference to the testimony of an officer who reported that he received secret orders regarding the massacres relayed to the provinces. "In other words," Dadrian concludes, "Essad's document on the transmission of an official order by the Ottoman War Minister [the third of the documents acquired by the British in early 1919] is verified by the testimony of a military commander who received the order, demonstrated authenticity of the one document provided by Essad Points to the authenticity of the others." 33 

There are several problems with this way of reasoning. At the time when Commissioner Heck expressed his view of the nature of the instruction followed during the deportations, little reliable evidence regarding these instructions was as yet available; and Heck undoubtedly was relying on sources that cannot be considered truly probative. The same difficulty arises in connection with the courtmartial testimony invoked by Dadrian. Of the proceedings of the trial in Yozgat (see chapter 6), where the testimony in question was supposedly given, only the verdict has been preserved.34 

Dadrian's account of this testimony therefore has to rely on an article in a Constantinople newspaper, Renaissance. The original text of the testimony is not available. This, I submit, is hardly the kind of evidence that can be used to demonstrate the authenticity of a document. 

The British official who forwarded the "Ten Commandments" to London at the time had suggested that Essad be arrested "to prove to the hilt the authenticity of the draft 'Ten Commandments' document."35 Once they had him in custody they presumably could have compared his handwriting with that of the document he was supposed to have compiled in his capacity as secretary in the secret archives of the Ministry of the Interior. This was never done, however, as Gwynne Dyer has shown in careful analysis of the "Ten Commandments." 

Indeed there was no need to arrest Essad: as other Foreign Office files show, Essad was employed as an agent by the British High Commission in Constantinople at least until September 1919. The intelligence operative controlling him described him as "a low class intermediary" involved in the courier system functioning between the capital and the CUP exiles abroad. The fact that the British made no inquiries of him about the "Ten Commandments" suggests that they soon had come to doubt the authenticity of this document.36 As mentioned earlier, it was never noted or used by the law officers collecting evidence against the Young Turks. 

Dadrian has attempted to establish the authenticity of the "Ten Commandments" by pointing to the similarity between the provisions of this blueprint and the actual course of the deportations. His version of these events is certainly not to be considered the last word on the subject. However, even if his description of the deportations was to be accepted as fully accurate, the similarity between the provisions of the "Ten Commandments" and the deportations would not necessarily rule out forgery. 

Dyer has summed up the overall impression that one obtains from reading the "Ten Commandments": they "resemble the result of an attempt after the fact to reconstruct what might have been said, had the actual events of April 1915—mid 1916 all been foreordained in a single comprehensive  official document months before their initiation." 37  


Still another secret meeting that is said to substantiate the element of premeditation and the guilt of the CUP leadership for the massacres is described in memoirs written by a purported member of the central committee of the CUP, Mevlanzade Rifat. The book in question, Turkiye inkilabinin ic yiibii (The Inner Aspects of the Turkish Revolution), was published in Aleppo in 1929. According to several Armenian authors, Mevlanzade Rifat participated in this meeting, held in February T915, in which "the savage plan to destroy the Armenian people was first formulated." 38 

The meeting is said to have been chaired by Talaat and attended by several other high-ranking CUP leaders. The main report, Rifat relates, was given by Dr. Nazim, who proposed the total destruction of the Armenian minority:

If we are going to be satisfied with the kind of local massacres that occurred in Adana and other places in 1909 ... if this purge is not going to be universal and final, instead of good, it will inevitably result in harm. It is imperative that the Armenian people be completely exterminated; that not even one single Armenian be left on our soil; that the name, Armenian, be obliterated. We were now at war; there is no more auspicious occasion than this; the intervention of the great powers and the protests of the newspapers will not even be considered; and even if they are, the matter will have become an accomplished fact, and thus closed forever. The procedure this time will be one of total annihilation—it is necessary that not even one single Armenian survive this annihilation.39 

After some of the other central committee members had expressed their views, Rifat goes on, a resolution embodying Dr. Nazim's proposal to exterminate the Armenians to the very last man was adopted unanimously: 

The Ittihad ve Terrake Party recommended that a special organization beset up for carrying out this decision, made up of criminals and murderers under the direction of the "three-man executive committee," composed of Dr. Nazim, Dr. Behaettin Shakir, and the Minister of Education, Shoukrie.40 

Following this vote, Dr. Sakir is said to have spelled out the plan of execution. The police officers accompanying the convoys of deportees from the various cities would hand the Armenians over to the special force of convicts released from the prisons, who would be waiting "at various suitable points on the road designated by us." These assassins would put to death every last Armenian, throw rhem into pits prepared in advance, and appropriate the money, jewelry, and other personal belongings found on the murdered Armenians.41 

Among the relatively few authors who have bought into the story told by Mevzanlade Rifat is Hovannisian.42 

In 1973 Walker invoked this source in support of his argument that the killing of the Armenians was premeditated and represented a carefully planned plot, but by 1997 he had changed his mind and conceded that Rifat's account of the secret CUP meeting "appears to be a fraud and cannot be accepted as sound evidence, at least until a comprehensive bibliographical inquiry is published on the origin of the book and the authenticity or otherwise of its content."43 

Florence Mazian (in a book supporting the genocide thesis published in 1990) refers to the work of Rifat, whom she calls "a former member of the Ittihad Central Committee."44 For reasons that will become obvious in a moment, the Kurdish historian Kamal Madhar Ahmad also cites the memoirs of the "leading Unionist" Rifat as proof of the Turkish government's plans to exterminate the Armenians.45 

The generally skeptical reception of Mevzanlade Rifat's account has been due primarily to the painstaking research into the background of the alleged Young Turk leader by Gwynne Dyer published in 1973, which has since been backed up by other scholars.46 Rifat, it turns out, was a Kurd who never belonged to the CUP. Still less was he a member of its central committee and in a position to have access to secret plans for the annihilation of the Armenians. 

To the contrary, from the time of the 1908 revolution on Rifat led a party in bitter opposition to the Young Turks; in 1909, when he was implicated in the reactionary coup against the CUP, a courtmartial sentenced him to ten years' banishment from Constantinople. After the armistice of 1918 Rifat was back in the Turkish capital, where he participated in Kurdish efforts to obtain independence for Kurdistan; but following the assumption of power by the Kemalists he went into political exile again. 

Despite the prominent Kurdish role in the wartime massacre of the Armenians, Kurds and Armenians had begun to cooperate at the Paris peace conference and continued their efforts to build a common front against the Kemalist regime in the following years. 47 During this time Rifat acted as liaison between Kurds and Armenians.

His book, published in 1929, must be seen in this context. It represented an attempt to absolve the Kurds of responsibility for the wartime massacres by putting all the guilt for the killings on the CUP leaders and on the ex-convicts mobilized by them. 

"Presumably," writes Michael M. Gunter, "such 'revelations' would facilitate an Armenian-Kurdish alliance."48 Dyer concludes that the book could ease Armenian-Kurdish cooperation by "transferring all blame to evil Ittihadist Turks who had prearranged and guided the entire operation from Istanbul."49

Dadrian acknowledges that Rifat was a Kurd and an "avowed Ittihadist opponent" but nevertheless cites him as a source of information for "one of the super-secret meetings of Ittihad, during which the decision for the Armenian genocide was being debated."50 Dadrian fails to explain how an "avowed Ittihadist opponent" could obtain information about decisions taken at one of the "super secret meetings" of the CUP. 

To the best of my knowledge, Suny is the only scholar on the Armenian side who has openly and publicly expressed his skepticism of the kind of evidence that Dadrian and other like-minded authors have put forth in support of the premeditation thesis. While stating his belief that the massacres represented an act of genocide, Suny has denied that this crime resulted "from long-term planning by militant nationalists." When criticized by Dadrian for his more "balanced" approach, Suny reaffirmed that he remained "unconvinced that there was premeditation and prewar initiation of plans for genocide as Dadrian has often argued."51  

1. Richard G. Hovannisian, ed., Remembrance and Denial: The Case of the Armenian Genocide, pp. 14—15. 
2. Dadrian, Warrant for Genocide, p. 97. 
3. In this chapter and in the following chapter, much of the time my discus sion focuses on the work of Vahakn N. Dadrian, who is the best-known exponent of the premeditation thesis and who has been called the "foremost scholar of the Armenian Genocide" (Peter Balakian, The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America's Response, p. xvii). Dadrian's approach, Malcolm E. Yapp has correctly noted in reviewing one of his recent books, "is not that of an historian trying to find out what happened and why but that of a lawyer assembling the case for the prosecution in an adversarial system" (review of The History of the Armenian Genocide by V. N. Dadrian, in Middle Eastern Studies 32 [1996]: 397). A German scholar, Hilmar Kaiser, who is generally supportive of the Armenian side and accepts the charge of genocide, has nevertheless pointed out the "selective use of sources" in another of Dadrian's books and has concluded that "serious scholars should be cautioned against accepting all of Dadrian's statements at face value" ("Germany and the Armenian Genocide: Reply to Vahakn N. Dadrian's Response," Journal of the Society for Armenian Studies 9 [1996-99}: 139—40). I have heeded this warning.
4. Dadrian, Warrant for Genocide, p. 95. Other attempts to link the mass killing of Armenians in World War 1 to the ideology of the Young Turks are made by Mihran Dabag, "Jungtiirkische Visionen und der Volkermord an den Armeniern," in Genozid und Mod erne, ed. Mihran Dabag and Kristin Piatt, vol. 1, pp. 152— 205; and by Taner Akcam, From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide, p. 150. 
5. Great Britain, Foreign Office, British Documents on the Origin of the War 1898—1914, p. 208. 
6. Jean Naslian, Les memoires des Mgr. Jean Naslian, eveque de Trebizonde, p. 10 (n. 6), 148, 412, quoted in Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Secret Young-Turk Ittihadist Conference and the Decision for the World War 1 Genocide of the Armenians," Journal of Political and Military Sociology 22 (1994): 194 (n. 14). 
7. James H. Tashjian, "On a 'Statement' Condemning the Armenian Genocide of T9T5-T8 Attributed in Error to Mustafa Kemal, Later The Ataturk,'" Armenian Review 35 (1982): 228, 232-33; Ternon, The Armenians, p. 289 (n. 24).
8. Dadrian, "The Secret Young-Turk Ittihadist Conference," p. 179.
9. Ternon, The Armenians, p. 134. 
10. Andrew Mango, "Understanding Turkey," Middle Eastern Studies 18 (1982): 212. 
11. James Reid, "The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman and Turkish Historiography," Armenian Review 37, no. 1 (Spring 1984): 31. 
12. Stephan H. Astourian, "Genocidal Process: Reflections on the ArmenoTurkish Polarization," in The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics, ed. RichardG. Hovannisian, p. 69. 
13. Balakian, The Burning Tigris, p. 163. 
14. Haigazn K. Kazarian, "A Catalogue of Those Principally Responsible for the 1915—1918 Massacres," Armenian Revieiv 29 (1976): 272. 
15. LJriel Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The hife and Teachings of Ziya Gbkalp, p. ix; Robert Devereux, preface to Ziya Gokalp, The Principles of Turk ism, p. x. 
16. Gokalp, Principles of Turkism, pp. 20, 28. 
17. Taha Parla, The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gokalp, 1876—1921], pp. 120, 19, 25—26.
18. Gotthard Jaschke, Der Turanismus der Jungtiirken: Zur Osmanischen Aussenpolitik im Weltkriege, pp. 5, 8. 
19. Introduction to Ziya Gokalp, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays, trans. Niyazi Berkes, pp. 15, 8. 
20. Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism, p. 129. 
21. Dadrian, "The Convergent Roles of the State and Governmental Party in the Armenian Genocide," p. 114. 
22. Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism, p. 36. 
23. Robert Melson, "Provocation or Nationalism: A Critical Inquiry into the Armenian Genocide of 1915," in The Armenian Genocide, ed. Hovannisian, p. 76. 
24. Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism, p. 35. 
25. Parla, Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gokalp, p. 15. See also Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, pp. 415—16. 
26. Memo of C. E. Heathcote Smith, February 4, 1919, FO 371/4172/31307, pp. 384-86. 
27. Dadrian, "The Secret Young-Turk Ittihadist Conference," p. 177. 
28. Christopher J. Walker, "Letter to the Editor," Middle Eastern Studies 9 (1973): 376. 
29. FO 371/4172/3T307, pp. 388-89.
30. See, for example, Sir H. Lamb's minute of August 11, 1920, FO 371/6500/3557. 
31. Memo of Major Cameron, February 25, 1920, WO 32/5620/5897, p. 16. 
32. Heck's memo (867.4016/409) is reproduced in the microfiche collection edited by Rouben Paul Adalian, The Armenian Genocide in the United States Archives. 1915-1918, fiche 95. 
33. Dadrian, "The Secret Young-Turk Ittihadist Conference," p. 178. 
34. Taner Akcam, Armenien und der Volkermord: Die Istanbuler Prozesse und die tiirkische Nationalbewegung, p. 163. 
35. FO 371/4172/31307, p. 386. 
36. Gwynne Dyer, "Letter to the Editor," Middle Eastern Studies 9 (1973): 378. 
37. Ibid. 
38. Sarkisian and Sahakian, Vital Issues, p. 32. See also Haigaz K. Kazarian, "Minutes of Secret Meetings Organizing the Turkish Genocide of Armenians," Armenian Review 18, no. 3 (Autumn 1965): 23. 
39. Rifac, Turkiye, pp. 159—60, quoted in Sarkisian and Sahakian, Vital Issues in Modern Armenian History, p. 32. 
40. Rifat, Turkiye, p. 148, quoted in ibid., p. 34. 
41. Rifat, Turkiye, pp. 194—95, quoted in ibid., pp. 35-36. 
42. Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to Independence, p. 174 (n. 47). Hovannisian in the same place also accepts the authenticity of the equally dubious Andonian documents, which I discuss in the next chapter. 
43. Walker, "Letter to the Editor," p. 376; Christopher J. Walker, "World War I and the Armenian Genocide," in The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian, p. 247. 
44. Florence Mazian, Why Genocide?: The Armenian and Jewish Experiences in Perspective, p. 61.
45. Ahmad, Kurdistan during the First World War, p. 165.
46. Dyer, "Letter to the Editor," pp. 379—82. Sec also Kansu, Politics in PostRevolutionary Turkey, pp. 140, 184—85. 
47. The text of an accord between the Dashnaks and the Kurdish National League "Iloybun" signed in 1927 is reproduced in Hamit Bozarsian, "Histoirc des relations kurdo-armeniennes," in Kurdistan und Europa: Einblicke in die kurdische Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. Hans-Lukas Kieser, pp. 182—86. 
48. Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma, p. 114. 
49. Dyer, "Letter to the Editor," p. 382.
50. Dadrian, "The Convergent Roles of the State and Governmental Party," p. TOO. 
51. Suny, "Empire and Nation," p. 17, and "Reply to My Critics," p. 134.