By Orkhan Sattarov, the head of the European Bureau of Vestnik Kavkaza
The upcoming deal of Iran and the West – achieved after arduous negotiations between the six international mediators and President Rouhani’s team in Lausanne – has once again put international spotlight on the country. After the potential de-isolation of Iran, the geopolitical situation in the region will undergo a major revamp. Tehran has already got rid of its much-hated regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, replaced with a Shiite government, its allied regime of Bashar Al-Assad has not been unseated (there are rising signs that the West is ready to resume the dialogue with the Syrian government, to the disappointment of Turkey), the Houthi rebel movement in Yemen has taken the military initiative and partly brought the conflict to the border of Saudi Arabia.
Iran’s actions in the South Caucasus gain a lot less coverage in world media, unlike its conduct in the Middle East Region. Meanwhile, the South Caucasus Region traditionally remains an arena for struggle between Russia, Turkey and Iran. After a break of 70 years, when the South Caucasus was a part of the USSR, there were no attempts to challenge its geopolitical alignment. For the sake of truth, it should be noted that in 1981, long before the disintegration of the USSR, the Chairman of the Islamic Consultative Council of Iran (later the fourth president), Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, recognized Azerbaijan as an independent state. His recognition was not followed by any long-term political consequences. The situation has changed greatly since the early 1990s, when Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan were formed after the collapse of the USSR.
In the last two decades, which is quite a short moment in Iranian history, the country has lost half of its territory. The Turkmenchay Treaty of 1828 fixed the annexation by Russia of the lands where Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia are currently located. In Iran’s vision, the territory was the second most valuable region for the country.
This certainly does not mean that Iran is literally craving to get the lands back. However, such theses have been voiced in the Iranian parliament and even by one of the candidates for president in the latest campaign. Overall, the South Caucasus republics are considered as the 'near abroad', and a field of direct national interests. The Iranian authorities have no doubts that the country has an indisputable right to play the dominant economic, political and diplomatic role in the South Caucasus. Iran has a wide range of instruments to influence the region, including economic, political, cultural, ideological and military components, and realize its goals.
Iran possesses rich oil and gas resources in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, but the Iranian regime demonstrates serious geopolitical activity in both areas. The richest oil and gas reserves of the country are located in the Persian Gulf. This factor, in junction with the limited infrastructure opportunities, has made the use of resources on the Caspian Shelf a secondary objective. Iran is very concerned about the geoeconomic, military and geostrategic interests and security problems in the Caspian Sea and shows readiness to protect them decisively. Iran demonstrated this in 2001 when it attacked an explorer ship of British Petroleum heading to a field disputed by Baku and Tehran. The incident became one of the most tense standoffs between Azerbaijan and Iran throughout the history of their relations. The tensions were complemented by regular violations of airspace by the Iranian Air Forces. Only an analogical demonstrative act by the Turkish Air Forces in Baku and the visit of Heydar Aliyev to Tehran in 2002 simmered the discords down.
Iranian geopolicy in the basin of the Caspian is not limited solely to joint exploitation of energy resources. It serves to strengthen its geoeconomic, military and geostrategic positions in the region. Different positions in the settlement of the legal status of the Caspian Sea remain one of the long-term factors in the instability of Iranian-Azerbaijani relations. The dispute is about the method of splitting the Caspian Sea. Being an enclosed water body, it is unaffected by any international maritime conventions. Iran wants every Caspian state to be given a share of 20% each, at some stages of the negotiation process it demanded 50%. Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan demand the separation according to the median line, which means that Iran may claim only 11-13.8% of the sea (depending on the boundary of the Iranian sector). Due to the unsettled status of the Caspian, exploration in the Alov, Araz and Sharg fields has been frozen.
The position of Baku, Astana and Ashkhabad is de jure backed by Russia, because Presidents Boris Yeltsin (Russia) and Nursultan Nazarbayev (Kazakhstan) outline a maritime boundary following the principle, so any revision of the Russian position would require automatic reconsideration of the Russian-Kazakhstani maritime boundary. Since the interests of Iran and Russia do not conflict in the Caspian, Moscow prefers to take a passive position on the issue.
Researcher Gulden Zholamanov notes that the policy of Iran in the Caspian Sea has so far been factored by the following strategic interests:
- enforcement of security of its northern borders by supporting stability and security in Central Asian states;
- development of relations with countries of the region within the framework of the common policy for de-isolation;
- the need to maintain good relations with Russia and Turkey. Relations with the latter are directly dependent on the level of discrepancies on the Kurdish, Syrian and now the Yemeni problems, and the new prospects of energy cooperation with Europe.
To be continued
What does the nuclear deal between the West and Iran offer the South Caucasus Region?By Orkhan Sattarov, the head of the European Bureau of Vestnik KavkazaThe upcoming deal of Iran and the West – achieved after arduous negotiations between the six international mediators and President Rouhani’s team in Lausanne – has once again put international spotlight on the country. After the potential de-isolation of Iran, the geopolitical situation in the region will undergo a major revamp. Tehran has already got rid of its much-hated regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, replaced with a Shiite government, its allied regime of Bashar Al-Assad has not been unseated (there are rising signs that the West is ready to resume the dialogue with the Syrian government, to the disappointment of Turkey), the Houthi rebel movement in Yemen has taken the military initiative and partly brought the conflict to the border of Saudi Arabia.Iran’s actions in the South Caucasus gain a lot less coverage in world media, unlike its conduct in the Middle East Region. Meanwhile, the South Caucasus Region traditionally remains an arena for struggle between Russia, Turkey and Iran. After a break of 70 years, when the South Caucasus was a part of the USSR, there were no attempts to challenge its geopolitical alignment. For the sake of truth, it should be noted that in 1981, long before the disintegration of the USSR, the Chairman of the Islamic Consultative Council of Iran (later the fourth president), Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, recognized Azerbaijan as an independent state. His recognition was not followed by any long-term political consequences. The situation has changed greatly since the early 1990s, when Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan were formed after the collapse of the USSR.In the last two decades, which is quite a short moment in Iranian history, the country has lost half of its territory. The Turkmenchay Treaty of 1828 fixed the annexation by Russia of the lands where Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia are currently located. In Iran’s vision, the territory was the second most valuable region for the country.This certainly does not mean that Iran is literally craving to get the lands back. However, such theses have been voiced in the Iranian parliament and even by one of the candidates for president in the latest campaign. Overall, the South Caucasus republics are considered as the 'near abroad', and a field of direct national interests. The Iranian authorities have no doubts that the country has an indisputable right to play the dominant economic, political and diplomatic role in the South Caucasus. Iran has a wide range of instruments to influence the region, including economic, political, cultural, ideological and military components, and realize its goals.Iran possesses rich oil and gas resources in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, but the Iranian regime demonstrates serious geopolitical activity in both areas. The richest oil and gas reserves of the country are located in the Persian Gulf. This factor, in junction with the limited infrastructure opportunities, has made the use of resources on the Caspian Shelf a secondary objective. Iran is very concerned about the geoeconomic, military and geostrategic interests and security problems in the Caspian Sea and shows readiness to protect them decisively. Iran demonstrated this in 2001 when it attacked an explorer ship of British Petroleum heading to a field disputed by Baku and Tehran. The incident became one of the most tense standoffs between Azerbaijan and Iran throughout the history of their relations. The tensions were complemented by regular violations of airspace by the Iranian Air Forces. Only an analogical demonstrative act by the Turkish Air Forces in Baku and the visit of Heydar Aliyev to Tehran in 2002 simmered the discords down.Iranian geopolicy in the basin of the Caspian is not limited solely to joint exploitation of energy resources. It serves to strengthen its geoeconomic, military and geostrategic positions in the region. Different positions in the settlement of the legal status of the Caspian Sea remain one of the long-term factors in the instability of Iranian-Azerbaijani relations. The dispute is about the method of splitting the Caspian Sea. Being an enclosed water body, it is unaffected by any international maritime conventions. Iran wants every Caspian state to be given a share of 20% each, at some stages of the negotiation process it demanded 50%. Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan demand the separation according to the median line, which means that Iran may claim only 11-13.8% of the sea (depending on the boundary of the Iranian sector). Due to the unsettled status of the Caspian, exploration in the Alov, Araz and Sharg fields has been frozen.The position of Baku, Astana and Ashkhabad is de jure backed by Russia, because Presidents Boris Yeltsin (Russia) and Nursultan Nazarbayev (Kazakhstan) outline a maritime boundary following the principle, so any revision of the Russian position would require automatic reconsideration of the Russian-Kazakhstani maritime boundary. Since the interests of Iran and Russia do not conflict in the Caspian, Moscow prefers to take a passive position on the issue.Researcher Gulden Zholamanov notes that the policy of Iran in the Caspian Sea has so far been factored by the following strategic interests:- enforcement of security of its northern borders by supporting stability and security in Central Asian states;- development of relations with countries of the region within the framework of the common policy for de-isolation;- the need to maintain good relations with Russia and Turkey. Relations with the latter are directly dependent on the level of discrepancies on the Kurdish, Syrian and now the Yemeni problems, and the new prospects of energy cooperation with Europe.To be conti
