By Orkhan Sattarov, the head of the European Bureau of Vestnik Kavkaza
The upcoming deal between Iran and the West – achieved after arduous negotiations between six international mediators and President Rouhani’s team in Lausanne – has once again put the international spotlight on the country. After the potential de-isolation of Iran, the geopolitical situation in the region will undergo a major revamp. Iran’s actions in the South Caucasus gain a lot less coverage in world media, unlike its conduct in the Middle East Region. Meanwhile, the South Caucasus Region traditionally remains an arena og struggle between Russia, Turkey and Iran.
Iran pays great attention to cooperation with Russia, to compensate for the deteriorated ties with the US and the West. Russia is the main supplier of military equipment and technologies for Iran. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on April 13, 2015, to lift the ban on exports of the S-300 anti-missile systems to Iran, which appears to be the first sign of intensifying military and technical cooperation between the two countries in the context of Iran's de-isolation. Both countries are interested in stability in Central Asia and the South Caucasus - an essential aspect for Iran's access to China and Europe.
Iran has formed a historical approach to the regional security problems of Central Asia, the Caspian Basin and the South Caucasus, the military and geostrategic problems of the region and relations with local states in security enforcement. Both in the past and the present, the country's position has not undergone any serious changes. According to specialists, Iran is generally not interested in acute conflicts between regional countries and the instability that may follow. So, the country is well aware that contemporary history, for example, that of the Balkans and other regions, demonstrates the interference of foreign forces in any conflict. A serious conflict in the South Caucasus or the Caspian Region may lead to the involvement of non-regional forces, such as the US, OSCE, European Union, CSTO and other powers, strengthening their military and geostrategic positions in the region. Thus, Iran has made several proposals to countries of the Caspian and the Black Sea Basins, Central Asia and the South Caucasus, encouraging them to take joint complex measures to enforce security and settle conflicts in the region. It rules out the interference of any non-regional forces.
In the 1990s, the authorities of Iran proposed the formation of a common security system in the Caspian Basin and the South Caucasus. Tehran pursued the establishment of collective security using the 3+2 formula (the three republics of the South Caucasus, Russia and Iran). Iran voiced the idea of uniting the efforts of solely regional states, collaborating in regional security and foreign policy. Of course, when promoting the 3+2 formula, Iran anticipated removing Turkey from the system as the main geopolitical player of the region. In such a fashion, it was trying to keep its historical competitor away from the processes, taking into account Turkey's membership of NATO.
Regional countries expressed dubious impressions about the idea. For instance, Baku, associating security problems with a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the withdrawal of Armenia from its territory, expressed readiness to cooperate with any structure and bloc that could help in the accomplishing its territorial goals. Other countries of the region preferred to keep their independent choice of partners in the context of international, regional and national security, bilateral, multilateral ties and cooperation with international organizations. They gave no serious value to the offer and showed reluctance in supporting Iran's regional security formula.
After that, the Iranian authorities came up with the 3+3 formula for regional security in the South Caucasus, adding Turkey to the former idea. On the one hand, Iran wanted to gain the support of Azerbaijan, the closest partner of Turkey in the region, on the other hand, it wanted to neutralize US attempts to implicate Turkey in joint cooperation in regional security. Tehran did encourage meetings of the secretaries of Security Councils, speakers of parliament, ministers of economy and finances of the five Caspian states, and of the six states in the South Caucasus, the signing of an agreement on joint security via the formation of joint approaches. The initiative did not find sufficient support from Russia and Turkey. It was once again evident that the positions of Iran and other regional countries differed on regional security.
Iran actualized another proposal in regional security in April 2003. Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi had an initiative to create joint security forces of the region. The regional states were reluctant to provide full support.
Iran is honest about its geostrategic goals in the South Caucasus:
- to keep away foreign forces (US, Israel, NATO, EU and others) from the South Caucasus and the Iranian border;
- to solve regional problems only collectively with regional states;
- to find mechanisms preventing the countries of the Caspian Basin and the South Caucasus from acting contrary to Iran's will and to engage in the processes in cahoots;
- to establish relations with countries of a pro-Western allegiance at a high level, to set mechanisms affecting them;
- to intensify security cooperation with countries sharing the military and geostrategic interests of Iran.
There are reasons to suppose that, even if the nuclear deal succeeds, the traditional position of Iran's reluctance to allow foreign players to enter the Caspian and the South Caucasus Regions would not change. Even if in the bipolar world, the confrontation with the US did not turn Iran into a univocal ally of the USSR, the current nuclear deal would not turn Iran into an American ally in the context of a multipolar world. The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is very skeptical of the US, suspecting it of constant deceptions. Iran views itself as a regional power and an ideological center, so it is more eager to enter situational alliances with certain centers of power to accomplish its own political and economic goals. In this sense, the potential reconciliation with the West is a pragmatic approach opening the way to a technological revamp of Iran's infrastructure and exports of Iranian hydrocarbons to Western markets.
Russia's S-300 systems will boost Iran's security even further before even signing any document on the nuclear program. Russia was obviously pursuing its financial benefits when lifting the ban on S-300 shipments. Furthermore, delaying the shipments, Russia risked losing the Iranian arms market to China, which could send a similar complex, the HQ-9. An analogical situation has already happened in Turkey, when Russia conceded a tender worth $4 billion to China.
It is important to fathom that the process of reintegration into the world economy and revival of the economy would only stimulate Tehran's political ambitions in the region. In turn, it would reactivate the historical regional rivalry of Iran, Russia and Turkey. Iran, following the principles of political realism, will use the ideological factor of influence on the Shiite population of Azerbaijan, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh, and search for tools to expand its economic and political influence in Baku and Yerevan. Tehran may also restore economic cooperation with Tbilisi, which had in fact been minimized since Washington's harsh reaction. Moreover, Iran did not risk goinh for open regional confrontation with its more or less friendly Russian neighbour while being isolated. Now, a completely different situation is developing, it will be analyzed in the articles that follow.
