Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (hereafter referred to as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict) is a conflict in the course of which the Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven other districts of Azerbaijan have been occupied and presently remain under occupation of the Armed Forces of Armenia. The de-facto regime (so called “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” (“NKR”)) has been created in the occupied territories. This regime lacks any international recognition. According to the UN SC Resolutions 822,853,874 и 884 (1993), UN GA Resolution 62/243 (2008), Council of Europe Resolution 1416 (2005) as well as decisions by other international organizations and institutions, these territories, in line with the international law, constitute an integral part of Azerbaijan1.
Since 1992, the OSCE Minsk Group (OSCE MG), based on the mandate of the UN, mediates the conflict settlement process. Actually, the main role in the mediation process belongs to the three Co-Chairs of the MG OSCE (hereafter referred to as the Co-Chairs), accordingly, representing USA, France and Russia2.
On May 12, 1994, through the mediation of the Russian Federation, Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed on the ceasefire3, so called Bishkek protocol. This agreement remains in force until now. However, shootings between Armed Forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan across the Line of Contact, passing through the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, and the Armenia-Azerbaijan border happen from the very moment of conclusion of the ceasefire agreement. Recently, in particular, starting from the last year, situation in the conflict zone has been characterized with high tension and military escalations.
The present Report has been prepared with the aim of the political-military analysis of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Report shed lights on the main reasons of the escalation which is observed in the conflict zone.
As it was famously put by Clauzewitz, the warfare is the continuation of policy by other means4. That is why the war-related developments should be considered in the context of political interests of the warring parties. In the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, there is neither war nor peace but increasing trend of ceasefire violations with hardening political rhetoric accusing each other.
This trend is a sign that violence started to be those “other means” in political calculations of, at least, one of the sides. It merits analyzing whose political calculations favor such violence and what goals it intends to serve.
Violence in Azerbaijan’s calculations
For the last 21 years the position of Azerbaijan on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has not changed. Azerbaijan strives to liberate its occupied territories and ensure return of the forcibly displaced population to their places of origin in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh region5. What has changed, however, is the role of military in the conflict settlement.
Azerbaijan is in favor of peaceful negotiations with the hope that they will bring an end to the conflict and ensure achieving the abovementioned goal. However, lack of progress in the settlement process brings more and more disappointment to Azerbaijan.
On one hand, Azerbaijan makes it clear that it is ready to help Armenia to develop its economy and prefers substantive negotiations on the conflict settlement and supports the idea of comprehensive peace treaty, voiced by the French President Francois Holland6.
At the same time Azerbaijan signals that it will not endlessly tolerate occupation of its territories. Large-scale military reforms and modernization is a testament to its intention. In a way, Azerbaijan's policy can be characterized as “if not by carrot then by stick”. The stick aspect of the policy was several times explained as a readiness to liberate the occupied territories.
It is very clear here that liberation of the occupied territories can happen not through small-scale violations of the ceasefire like shootings, but large-scale military actions.
Indeed, small-scale violations of the ceasefire do not serve either to peaceful or military solution but represent a certain complicating factor for Azerbaijan. Why? First, it refocuses the OSCE MG from political settlement to technicalities of ceasefire. Second, small-scale violations may be considered as a psychological pressure on Azerbaijan, since this country having temporarily lost its territories cannot allow anymore the military dominance of Armenia.
For the present, there are constraining factors for Azerbaijan to engage in military operations which are twofold: 1) it initiated large-scale gas contracts. Their implementation requires utmost political concentration and resources. Also, the energy transportation pipelines lay in the vicinity of the Line of Contact and it makes them a target for the Armed Forces of Armenia. 2) Azerbaijan plans to host major international sport events such as the first ever European Games in 2015 and Islamic Games in 2017. These show that Azerbaijan is more engaged by enhancing its economic potential and promotion of its influence in the international affairs.
As Azerbaijan enjoys political stability and undertakes measure for further economic development, there is no much utility for this country in manipulating with military violence against Armenia for internal policy needs. Therefore, Azerbaijan cannot be a source of escalation along the Armenia-Azerbaijan frontline.
Violence in Armenia’s calculations
Armenia's policy towards the conflict settlement also remains unchanged though it has inherent contradictions. Armenia's Constitution refers to the Armenia's Declaration of Independence that builds on «reunification» with Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan7. On the other hand, Armenia officially views Karabakh as an “independent state” even though not recognized by itself. For the last 21 years Armenia's policy has rested on the belief that “time is working for its favor”. Following this believe, Armenia attempted to change demographic and administrative realities in the occupied territories by settling Armenians from elsewhere and creating new administrative units therein. In parallel to this, Armenia tries to achieve at least partial recognition of «NKR» with a view of changing legal and political realties which should have rendered ineffective the UN SC and other international documents that recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijan's territory. Armenia was also confident in the capacity of its Armed Forces.
However, 20 years after the ceasefire agreement concluded, Armenia has not managed to force Azerbaijan through negotiations to give its consent for annexation of its territories. Equally, Armenia could not achieve international recognition of “NKR” as it happened for instance with Kosovo.
Changing context has brought risks to Armenia's “peaceful” annexation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Two interrelated factors have played a role in this:
1) Financial crisis of 2008 made a blow to Armenia's economy which contracted almost by 12-15%. New hardships manifested itself through deterioration of socio-economic situation and resulted in mass emigration not only from Armenia but also from the occupied territories. As economy was stagnating a new economic crisis started with crisis in Russia from which Armenia heavily depends. This process also causes increased risks to the political stability in Armenia. 2) The second factor has to do with Azerbaijan. As Armenia was struggling with crisis, Azerbaijan, as it indicated above, has been steadily developing its economy, not least, due to its rich natural resources. It allowed Azerbaijan to heavily invest also into its defense which acquired sophisticated state of the art equipment and technologies. Ten years ago the Armenian officials felt proud of their military success and advantage over Azerbaijan. However, the Armenian president S.Sargsyan is officially expressing now his concern over military capabilities of Azerbaijan8. Seriousness of Armenia's concern is seen from the fact that official Yerevan referred to security considerations while explaining its sudden decision to join the Eurasian Union.
Confidence of Armenia in its military fades away as does its economic and demographic strength. Meanwhile power of Azerbaijan increases. Widening gap between Armenia and Azerbaijan in economic, demographic and military terms logically brings changes to Armenia's political calculus. Along with that, Armenia has a bitter memory of relying upon its allies as manifested itself after the WWI. Armenia does have suspicions over quality of relations with its main allies which are in good terms with Azerbaijan. In these circumstances, time can not any more favor Armenia to achieve its abovementioned goals.
Moreover, internal socio-economic hardships created challenges for the ruling elite at the core of which stands the Armenia’s army. Victory in the Nagorno-Karabakh war at the beginning of 1990s elevated the status of the army within the Armenian society. Army is not only a fighting but also a political force deciding the fate of Armenian leadership. It supported R.Kocharian in overthrowing L.Ter-Petrossian in 1997 while it dispersed by force a protesting crowd against the rigged elections that brought S.Sargsyan to power.
Nevertheless, for the last years the institute of Armed Forces of Armenia has been loosing its influence. According to various media reports, in present day Armenia oligarchs are stronger and more influential than Armenian army and former leaders of the Karabakh war. The case of Vage Avthyan, the Head of ENT Department of the Yerevan Military Garrison Hospital, is enough illustrative in this regard. On July, 2012, he was beaten to death by the security guards of the restaurant “Arsnakar”, which belongs to oligarch Ruben Ayrapetyan9. There are a lot of similar cases when people and bodyguards of Armenian oligarchs with no fear of punishment lead street wars, including with militaries.
In this context, the Armenian leadership hurries to seek a solution to the problem by taking itself an initiative. However, Armenia has no resources to achieve its goals. It should be also stressed that the Ukrainian crisis brought increased focus on the principles of respect to territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of states. Ironically, it leaves the military as an only option that Armenia can use.
Several factors that Armenia manages well can have enabling effect upon utilization of military as the convenient instrument of action for achieving its goals. The first is “blame game” which proceeds from the assumption that the side that starts military actions will lose international support to its cause. As Azerbaijan is the side that aspires for status quo change and it stated on several occasions that it possesses capability to militarily liberate the occupied territories from Armenian forces, it will not be difficult for Armenia to put blame on Azerbaijan and gain international support. The second proceeds from the first and builds upon the image of Armenia as a nation that allegedly underwent ‘genocide’ from the Ottoman Empire. Any military action ascribed to Azerbaijan will be framed as “continuation of genocide” to receive increased support from Western nations. The third is to capitalize on negative image of radical sects within certain Moslem communities and the fact that majority of the Azerbaijani population are Moslems. Although the secular Azerbaijani state is famous for its traditions of multiculturalism and tolerance as well as makes an active contribution to international efforts in fight against terrorism, radicalism and extremism, Armenia may blame Azerbaijan for launching military actions and present it as ‘yet another annihilation of first Christian people’.
One should not forget that along with enabling, there are also constraining factors for Armenia’s recourse to military option. First of all, the Armenian society seems to be very sensitive to losses among personnel of its Armed Forces. It is manifested, for instance, in frequent protests of mothers of deceased soldiers in front of the building of Government of Armenia These protests are not initiated by Armenian opposition. The second is shrinking economy, social and demographical situation in the country. However, these factors are only constraining for protracted war while neutral for a short-term escalation.
Typology of actions, leading to tension and escalation
It should be mentioned that there are peacekeeping forces neither along the Line of Contact nor Armenia-Azerbaijan border10. Usually, twice per month the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office (together with its team) conducts monitoring of observance of ceasefire along the Line of Contact and the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. But in practice, particularly having in mind media reports that shootings happen even during such monitoring, the ceasefire is more or less being maintained by the armed forces of both sides.
Since the 1994 ceasefire, there have been observed occasional violations and even escalation of violence and political rhetoric of the sides. Nevertheless, these violations have never been a source of concern for a full-fledged war between Armenia and Azerbaijan until recently. In recent times the escalation trend has shifted and mass media labels such escalation as potentially leading to war11. Similar assessments may be found in the statements of Western officials.
As there occur many types of ceasefire violations and escalation, it is necessary to make distinctions among them:
1. Actions to protect defense perimeter. These actions lead to small-scale shootings between the units of Armenia and Azerbaijan Armed Forces deployed along the Line of Contact and the border. These violations constitute the actions that are undertaken at the lower, sub-tactical level. They happen from the moment of ceasefire conclusion, usually for the purpose of protection of the perimeter of defense posts. They are initiated by outpost and platoon (sometimes even company) commanders without special instruction from high level authorities. Along with this, there happen actions by military intelligence, aimed at learning situation on the ground, for instance, to specify positions of the adversary. The sides are usually ‘used’ to actions of each other and they don’t constitute a reason for large-scale clashes. In the course of such violations, losses among the Armed Forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan are, as a rule, rare.
2. Politically motivated actions. This type includes creation of escalation upon instruction of a higher command with a view to promote political interests. Various means are explored for purposes of escalation: intensive shooting towards military posts and peaceful settlements with the aim of rendering serious damage, sending subversive groupings to destroy military posts and etc. In the course of these actions, there occur, as a rule, more losses among the armed forces and civilians. These actions also happen at the lowest, sub-tactical level, i.e. without engaging major forces from reserve. These actions in the context of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict represent micro developments. However, their final goal is to instigate macro effect.
3. In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone there are also actions linked with demonstration of power. They include military exercises, parades or acquisition of armaments. Recently, Azerbaijan and Armenia conducted military exercises and parades where they demonstrated their armaments. The specific feature of these actions of Azerbaijan is a display of newest armament with the aim to exert psychological pressure on Armenia. The latter, in its turn, provokes Azerbaijan by frequently conducting exercises in the occupied territories.
4. There is also the fourth type of actions, though still theoretic one, related to use of heavy armament, such as tanks and heavy-gun armament. However, there has been little information that Armenia and Azerbaijan used this type of armament.
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1. http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/027/1802728.pdf2. За последнее время МГ ОБСЕ стала объектом серьезной критики за свою неэффективную роль в урегулировании конфликта. Тем не менее, данный отчет не содержит оценки посреднической деятельности МГ ОБСЕ.3. http://www.osce.org/mc/39554?download=true4. http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/clausewitz-on-war-vol-1#lf1380-01_label_0565. В ходе конфликта из Армении и с оккупированных территорий Азербайджана было изгнано более одного миллиона азербайджанцев.6.http://azertag.az/ru/xeber/Elmar_Mamedyarov_Prisutstvie_voisk_Armenii_na_territorii_Azerbaidzhana___eto_samay a_bolshaya_ugroza_miru_v_regione-111552, http://bakupost.az/siyaset/bolge/20150219043230701.html7. http://www.parliament.am/parliament.php?id=constitution&lang=eng8. http://www.panorama.am/ru/politics/2009/10/02/ssargsyan5/?sw9.http://arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=4DB868C0-C20D-11E1-9965F6327207157C10. Хотя и существуют решения Будапештского саммита ОБСЕ от 1994 о развертывании в регионе многонациональных сил по поддержанию мира (http://www.osce.org/mc/39554?download=true), а также Группа Планирования Высокого Уровня (http://www.osce.org/hlpg)11. К примеру: http://www.rferl.org/content/caucasus-report-karabakh-war-dance/26521123.html, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/01/world/asia/clashes-intensify-between-armenia-and-azerbaijan-over-disputed-land.html?_r=01. http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/027/1802728.pdf
2. Recently the OSCE MG has become a subject of serious criticism for its ineffective mediation in the conflict settlement. The present Report doesn't cover evaluation of the OSCE MG mediation activities.
3. http://www.osce.org/mc/39554?download=true
4. http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/clausewitz-on-war-vol-1#lf1380-01_label_056
5. In the course of the conflict, Armenia forcibly expelled more than one million Azerbaijanis from its own territory and the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.
6. http://azertag.az/ru/xeber/Elmar_Mamedyarov_Prisutstvie_voisk_Armenii_na_territorii_Azerbaidzhana___eto_samay a_bolshaya_ugroza_miru_v_regione-111552, http://bakupost.az/siyaset/bolge/20150219043230701.html
7. http://www.parliament.am/parliament.php?id=constitution&lang=eng
8. http://www.panorama.am/ru/politics/2009/10/02/ssargsyan5/?sw
9.http://arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=4DB868C0-C20D-11E1-9965F6327207157C
10. Though there are decisions of the OSCE 1994 Budapest on deployment of the multinational peacekeeping forces in the region (http://www.osce.org/mc/39554?download=true) as well as High Level Planning Group (http://www.osce.org/hlpg)
11. For instance: http://www.rferl.org/content/caucasus-report-karabakh-war-dance/26521123.html, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/01/world/asia/clashes-intensify-between-armenia-and-azerbaijan-over-disputed-land.html?_r=0
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See Part 2 Political-military analysis of the Armenia-Azerbaijan frontline. Part 2
