The most serious violations of the ceasefire
Reported cases of ceasefire violations for 2013-2014 had several characteristics.
1) Reports inform about increased frequency of ceasefire violations. Analysis of reports shows that large-scale military engagement beyond sub-tactical level has not taken place so far. Tension along the Line of Contact and the border was mostly maintained by small arms and light weapons.
2) Increased frequency of reports was accompanied by enhanced political attention and manipulation. Mass and social media monitoring shows that political rhetoric gave to public an impression of impending restart of large-scale hostilities though pattern of violence were still confined to the sub-tactical level.
3) An important finding of the monitoring is that Armenia's top leadership made more statements immediately after violations thus exacerbating war discourse among the country's public.
Table 1 below captures main ceasefire violations and their relationship with principal political developments in the conflict settlement process.
Table 1. Ceasefire violations in 2013
Table 1 shows intensive violations of ceasefire and deterioration of the situation in the frontline in 2013 which usually happened either before or after political negotiations between the sides. These could not help but create tense atmosphere around the negotiations and affect their consequences. With this in mind, it should be said that 2013 didn’t register any progress in the peaceful settlement. Only in November of 2013, after two years break, the Co-Chairs managed to arrange a meeting at the highest level in Vienna. Content of those negotiations remained confidential. However, developments in 2014 reconfirmed that initiative on the political track might fail if military-tactical situation in the conflict zone is skillfully utilized (see Table 2).
Table 2 displays that after the Presidential meeting in Vienna in 2013, the mediators continued the efforts to promote the peace process. The President of France and the OSCE Swiss Chairmanship also focused on the settlement.
However, the developments in 2014 had a different feature: attempts to escalate the situation along the frontline with resulting tension at the political level were undertaken not only through covert means, but also sometimes by open provocations in the zone of conflict.
It should be underlined in this regard the following three moments:
By doing so, Armenia is very well aware that:
o How painfully the Azerbaijani side reacts to opening of airport in the occupied Khojaly city. This issue particularly has been intensively discussed with the support of mediators in the course of 2012-2013. Despite their numerous calls not to make the situation strained, the two-seat airplane was launched by Armenia in June from the airport in Khodjaly.
o Killing one and taking hostage two Azerbaijani civilians in July of 2014, and then arranging their illegal trial and refusal to return them to Azerbaijan continue disturb public opinion in Azerbaijan.
o Penetration of military helicopters deeper inside the positions of Armed Forces of Azerbaijan may be assessed as a peak of obvious escalation along the frontline. Non-visible side of this escalation was the subversive attacks of the Armenian intelligences officers to the positions of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces. The major of these attacks took place in July of 2014, when President and Minister of Defense of Azerbaijan were out of the country21. In 2014 as in 2013 escalation took place usually before or after the most important political events/negotiations. The three most important among them may be outlined:
In 2013-2014 Armenia and Azerbaijan also conducted military parades and exercises. When it comes to parades, they had various functions in the context of interests of Armenia and Azerbaijan. For Azerbaijan, which conducted one parade during this period of time, this action had broader aims and were as a kind of indicator of self-reliance of the country, particularly, when Azerbaijan doesn’t participate in any collective military alliance like NATO or CSTO. Moreover, parade was expression of the independent foreign policy of Azerbaijan. Along with that, this action served as a kind of political message for Armenia that Azerbaijan had enough military capability to back its resolve to restore its territorial integrity. For Armenia, which is in the CSTO, the military parade is also a kind of political answer to Azerbaijan, particularly, when it is conducted in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.
As to the military exercises, in the context of the increasing trend of ceasefire violation, it should be underlined the following:
1. Military exercises as it is seen from the Table 3 (see below) are conducted very often.
2. These exercises included more forces and heavy armaments
3. The exercises are observed both in Armenia and in Azerbaijan by their authorities that shows strong political component of these actions.
4. Table 3 indicates that dates of military exercises in Armenia and Azerbaijan sometimes coincided which is a mutual “demonstration of muscles”
Table 3. Military exercises and parades in 2013-2014
Thus, both small-scale ceasefire violations and provocative actions took place in the course of 2013 and 2014. In 2014, as in 2013, there was no progress in the conflict settlement. Escalation put obstacles for diplomatic efforts of Azerbaijan in peaceful settlement of the conflict. The sides couldn’t even start the work on drafting the comprehensive peace agreement which the President of France called for and Azerbaijan is seriously looking for. It is not difficult to understand that instead of substantive negotiations in settlement, the mediators discussed how to reduce tension along the frontline. Escalation didn’t allow Azerbaijan to achieve its goals. On contrary, it brought Armenia closer to its strategic goals.
Summarizing the mentioned in this part, it should be noted the following: 1) Increase in number of ceasefire violations leads to the escalation, which lasts in terms of length more than before. For instance, in January of 2015, escalation lasted almost for 20 days. 2) Reports on ceasefire violations, in most cases, are managed with the aim of affecting broader political developments related to the conflict settlement and internal policy. 3) Although there is no report on engagement of heavy military enginery, nevertheless, the developments at the sub-tactical level reduces political certainty and predictability.
Escalation as means of pursuing political interests
Strategic context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and types of frequent violations of ceasefire shows that this is exactly Armenia that is the interested side in politically motivated escalation in sub-tactical level with possible political and strategic consequences. Armenia, thus, pursues the following three operative goals:
Maximum goal: Through escalation to provoke Azerbaijan to large-scale military actions and to gain opportunity for launching military strike onto the Azerbaijani oil-gas infrastructure. There is a popular thesis in military science that if one of the adversaries weakens and the opposite side gets stronger, the first one prevents unfavorable scenarios of developments for itself by attacking stronger enemy. Accounts of the historian Thucydides on the Peloponnesian war which was launched in 431 BC by Spartans due to the fear of Athens’s growing power is particularly cited in this regard22.
The Armenian side understands that once Azerbaijan is provoked to the large-scale military actions, it may instantly fight back several of the occupied districts around the Nagorno-Karabakh. However, within that period of time Armenia may have a chance to launch military strikes and impair economic damage to Azerbaijan, get the peacekeeping forces brought in into the conflict zone, under the pretext of Azerbaijani “attack” withdraw from negotiations and gain the argument for recognition of “NKR”. The another factor playing into the hands of Armenia is tension in the international affaires caused by the conflict in Ukraine. Notably, Armenia, which has allied relations with Russia, would wish through aggravation of military situation, to ensure Russia’s presence in the zone of conflict. In this regard, one may recall the German chancellor A.Merkel’s words on frequent ceasefire violations: “…The frequent violation of the ceasefire is, of course, a negative fact. I believe that a certain role here is played by Russia. I just wanted to mention that. I think that Russia and Armenia are jointly implementing certain factors associated with this conflict”23.
Intermediate goal: Escalation is needed to ensure reigning of Karabakh clan in Armenia and promote authority of Defense Minister Seyran Ohanyan as a main pretender for the presidential post in struggle with oligarchs. This scenario for the current President S.Sargsyan is also a kind of insurance and guarantee of immunity at the post-presidential period. For this to happen, however, it is necessary, first of all, to restore the trust of the Armenian society to the Armed Forces through ranks of which S.Sargsyan and S.Ohanyan were propelled to politics (they both were warlords in the Karabakh war). And this is possible only if the military success in the battle scene is achieved over Azerbaijan. It is in this context that the last moves of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense of Armenia should be evaluated. Notably, Minister of Defense S.Ohanyan through his directive gave freedom of actions to the commanders of battalion and companies of the Armed Forces of Armenia to elaborate and undertake military-tactic actions against the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan24. This command in fact means to create tension, and when possible, to attack and capture Azerbaijani positions. By the way, for such attacks it is often chosen the parts of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. The leadership of Armenia supposes that the Armenian society may not perceive seriously the artificially created threat along the Line of Contact, laying through Nagorno-Karabakh and other seven occupied territories since they don’t belong legally to Armenia and are situated relatively far from Yerevan. Unlike Line of Contact, tension along the borderline between Armenia and Azerbaijan may alarm the Armenian society and consolidate the society around the army. In this case, any success along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border will be, first of all, attributed to the Minister S.Ohanyan. Yet another proof of the thesis that the Armenian leadership utilizes escalation for internal political purposes is revelations of Armenian oligarch Gagig Tsarukyan. He was famous for his criticism of the authorities and intention to lead the opposition movement in Armenia. However, after the meeting with the President S.Sargsyan, G.Tsarukyan refused from political rally. The reason behind his refusal as he explained was the threats by President S.Sargsyan that sharpening of internal political situation in Armenia will be moved to the Armenia-Azerbaijan border and accordingly shed Armenian blood. G.Tsarukyan said to his fellow party members that he couldn’t assume responsibility for so much blood25.
Minimum goal: Escalation allows Armenia to prolong peace negotiations and avoid discussions of issues of essential nature, such as withdrawal of forces from the occupied territories adjacent to the Nagorno-Karabakh region, return of displaced people to their homes and etc. Escalation allows Armenia to refocus negotiations on non-substantial issues such as withdrawal of snipers, increasing monitoring missions, investigation of incidents and etc. At the same time, President S.Sargsyan through escalation attempts tries to create a certain anxiety in the West as his relations with them soured after Armenia joined the Eurasian Union. This might give him an opportunity for reestablishment of contacts with the West.
The course and results of the escalation is presented to the international community by Armenia in the form that serves its interest best. Here, Armenia equipped itself with another popular in the military science concept that all warfare is based on deception26. This theory was elaborated by Sun Tzu, the Chinese military strategist. Armenia applies this concept as follows: while provoking escalation, present yourself as innocent.
The Armenian side, both officially and unofficially (mainly through media) attempts to create a stereotype that it is not Armenia, but Azerbaijan which violates ceasefire, since the Azerbaijani side is not interested in status-quo and that is why it strives for changing status-quo in one–way fashion27.
In line with the concept that “warfare is based on deception” Armenia distributes in details reports on alleged ceasefire violations by Azerbaijan, reveals information, though partly, about its losses, while before in many instances it have been successfully hiding them, and tries to show Azerbaijan as a country resorting to force. It is due to this tactic that Armenian media has been recently allowed to indicate Armenia as a place of birth and residence of killed soldiers. It has been concealing this information before in order to avoid Azerbaijani accusations about Armenian military aggression.
Armenia has been actively using this tactics for recent years. For the time being it reached its high point. Nevertheless, it should be also underlined that Armenia had effectively used it even before. For instance, still in 1991-1994, at the height of military actions, Armenia, while using force and occupying the territories of Azerbaijan, also conducted active propaganda and manipulated opinion of the international community. The indicator of effectiveness of such a manipulation may be Section 907 to the Freedom Support Act, which bans direct support of the USA to Azerbaijan, i.e. the victim of aggression.
Conclusion
It seems that the Co-Chairs understand quite well the current situation and real intentions of Armenia. It is probably due to this fact that in their statement in Kharkiv they called upon Azerbaijan to observe its commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict28. By this way, the Co-Chairs gave a clear message to Azerbaijan about the real intentions of Armenia and hinted not to succumb to its provocations.
Further utility of the military escalation for Armenia will depend on whether this process develops in accordance with Armenia’s plans. Does the Armenian leadership comprehend all risks to Armenia associated with escalation?! It seems that the answer is yes. In this context, one can assert that it decided to bet the runch. From this point, one may foresee that escalation in the zone of conflict will be directly proportional to strengthening of Azerbaijan, worsening of internal political situation in and further weakening of Armenia.
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1. http://www.osce.org/mg/98944
2. http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/219690/
3. http://www.osce.org/mg/101604
4. http://www.versia.am/armiya-oboroni-nkr/
5. http://www.osce.org/mg/102856
6. http://www.osce.org/mg/103570
7. http://minval.az/news/14545/, http://news.am/rus/news/164903.html
8. http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/231859/
9. http://www.osce.org/mg/108551
10. http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/234058/
11. http://ria.ru/world/20140125/991331760.html
12. http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/239752/
13. http://www.osce.org/mg/117180
14. http://1news.az/politics/karabakh/20140317042342297.html, http://1news.az/politics/karabakh/20140317042342297.html
15. http://kavpolit.com/blogs/sadatgulu/4436/
16. http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/243708/
17. http://www.tert.am/ru/news/2014/06/25/stepanakert-airport/1125187
18. http://www.osce.org/mg/121674
19. http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/President-discusses-Nagorno
20. http://www.osce.org/mc/109303?download=true
21. http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1832610.html
22. http://classics.mit.edu/Thucydides/pelopwar.1.first.html
23. http://www.armenianreport.com/pubs/99342
24. http://www.lragir.am/index/rus/0/country/view/40137
25. http://ru.1in.am/1083044.html
26. http://classics.mit.edu/Tzu/artwar.html
27. Speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia in Basel, http://www.mfa.am/ru/press-releases/item/2014/12/04/min_osce04122014/, Interviews Armenian MP Ruben Hakobyan http://ru.aravot.am/2014/08/05/181788/
28. http://www.osce.org/mg/136876
