The fundamental flaw of integration projects is in the machinery of political decision-making itself
We return to the topic of integration projects in the countries of the former Soviet Union on the VK pages. This is because events in Kyrgyzstan have once more displayed the vulnerability of key integration project systems under the aegis of Russia, all the way from the CSTO to the SCO. With a certain degree of perplexity and bewilderment, the silent question "what's next?" not only present in the arguments of high-ranking Russian officials. A similar general
feeling can also be observed among Chinese diplomats, although such sentiments are novel in these circles. Everyone can see that something must be changed, but it turns out that almost nobody has any notion of what this is.
At the same time, we should acknowledge that the source of this situation is to be found not in the Kyrgyz events, but far earlier, in August 2008, when none of the numerous integration schemes actually managed to prevent Georgian aggression against South Ossetia . The fundamental flaw of integration projects is the machinery of political decision-making itself. This is caused by the fact that both the CSTO and SCO have to work in strict compliance with the principle of consensus decisions and to differentiate between issues related to internal aspects of member nations development and the foreign policy context, ideally embraced by the responsibility sphere of integration structures.
However, the events in Kyrgyzstan just showed that domestic instability in a minor FSU country would imminently become a headache for all the major players. For is not Kyrgyzstan's transformation into a black hole, a haven for drug pushers, arms smugglers and motley
extremists, a direct and evident threat to the huge geostrategic region between the Caspian Sea and Afghanistan?
So the question is that maybe it is easier to take preventive measures, to try to prevent the transformation of the whole country into a classic example of an abortive political entity? Are pogroms of Russian citizens' homes in Bishkek and danger to the lives of residents of other states at the end of the day just Kyrgyzstan's domestic affairs, or a cause for concern to neighboring countries and the main centers of power, which will inevitably act as sponsors for
post-crisis restoration in any case?
At the same time, the events in Kyrgyzstan have encouraged re-analysis of the general security situation in post-Soviet space. We cannot but admit that the results of this audit are not too comforting. For example, the lack of efficient dialogue on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in itself creates grave areas of tension throughout the South Caucasus.
Again we hear statements that this is no concern of the FSU countries'integration structures, just as in the case of Kyrgyzstan. Apparently, the Minsk Group mediators should decide. But it should be taken into consideration that the co-sponsors' capability of achieving a peace
settlement, with which they have been occupied over the past 15 years, is becoming more and more doubtful. The growth of generic conflict potential is a dangerous thing, because one cannot predict where and when it may burst out.
The Kyrgyz state collapsed literally in a day, and even on the eve of events in South Ossetia the majority of experts fondly believed that war wouldn't burst out. And now the calm statements that everything is tranquil around the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh do not seem so
convincing against the lamentable background of past conflicts in the FSU.
The perennial Russian question is: 'What to do?'. Of course, in every conflict, be it internal state disintegration or interstate conflict, the prescriptions should be given strictly on an individual basis. However, it is evident that there are still some common elements connected with the necessity for prompt security structure reforms in post-Soviet space. Economic and energy security are coming to the fore. Without their efficient implementation, ensuring stability of
any kind will be out of the question in the near future. The consensus solution principle discredits itself in integration structures more and more, transforming this instrument into a basis for a vain talking shop.
Where are those credits given to Bakiyev through the SCO and the emergency funds of the Eurasian Economic Community? How was the distribution of these funds controlled? I am not sure if anyone is able to give precise answers to these questions. It is this systematic
weakness of our unity, multiplied by the marginalization of elites and the danger that the gradual transformation of the area of Russia's responsibility "into an area of social disaster" is fraught with.
We're trying to put this smouldering fire out with money, unconscious of the fact that money is a poor medicine for the sick, in this case.
Alexei Vlasov, exclusively for VK,
