Azerbaijani oil industry in 1941. Part 1

The Azerbaijani Republic was the most important of the USSR’s sources of crude oil on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Since the level of external military threat had been constantly rising throughout the 1930's, the Soviet government paid special attention to development of the oil industry. However, several factors, including lack of proper equipment, hampered the process, while time was extremely short: the war was almost upon the country.

Meanwhile, international tensions surrounding the Absheron peninsula were going down to the wire: the UK and French governments were preparing an air assault on its oil-processing facilities. According to the British ambassador to Moscow, bombing of oil-production facilities in the Caucasus would "bring the USSR to its knees in a very short time." The UK Chief of Staff, General Ironside, prepared general plans for such an assault, providing Turkey and Iran would let British planes into their airspace.

At the time, the USSR was at war with Finland and the tensions between Britain, Germany and the USSR in the Scandinavian region were growing, Finland was to strike the Union from as many directions as possible so the general also suggested that the only way for the UK to assist and, most importantly, destroy Baku as an oil-processing center, as it would throw Russia’s war economy into disarray. As we will see, London was seriously considering an air strike against Baku in 1940 and deemed war with the USSR almost unavoidable. But Britain wasn’t the only power to comprehend the importance of Azerbaijani oil for the Union’s war efforts.

For example, Iranian Military Minister Nakhjavan made a request to the British military attaché concerning the purchase of 60 bombers and 20 fighter planes, in addition to those 15 that Britain had already promised Iran. Nakhjavan understood the British agenda pretty well, so he made the most compelling argument: he promised to devote half of Iran’s battle fleet to the task of destroying Baku. The Minister also proposed coordinating Iranian and British war efforts against the USSR. At the same time, the French government charged General Geonot, the head of the French Syrian airforce division, known for his words “the outcome of the war will be forged in the Caucasus and not on the Western front”, with planning an air assault on the Soviet Caucasus. A plan involving air strikes against Baku and Batumi was ready by the end of February. The authors of the plan reasoned that such strikes will undermine the very basis of the USSR's economic and military strength. The Union would find itself in a desperate situation and would be forced to stop all shipments to Germany, which would effectively close the blockade from the East.

Britain started reconnaissance flights over the Baku region in March 1940. However, the Wehrmacht’s successes in Norway, and then in Belgium and France, ended the UK’s plans for an assault on the USSR. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, even back then, the vital importance of the Azerbaijani oil fields for the USSR's war economy was clear to all the major players.

Hitler also was well aware of the importance of Soviet oil. It is interesting to mention that he estimated the losses among German soldiers in the war against Russia to be no higher than the number of workers involved in oil-processing. Oil resources were one of the most substantial reasons for Hitler attacking the USSR in the first place.

According to Speer, German Minister of Military Industry, who was questioned after the end of the war, the oil was in fact the main reason for the invasion. Caucasian oil was a sort of an obsession for Hitler: he thought that the Absheron oil fields would make the Third  Reich absolutely self-sufficient and, in the end, invincible.

To be continued

Mikhail Mukhin, PhD