In addition to the lack of oil-producing machines, oil producers were faced with a shortage of a variety of other materials and products
With regard to the commissioning of new wells, it should be noted that the tendency to commission old wells, which had been out of use for a certain period of time, declined. One gets the impression that the profit from the idle wells had been "cleared" before, and in 1941 the reserve of wells which could be revived was very small. In fact, new wells had already been put into operation since May, mainly by drilling. However, the drilling method was starting to produce lower results after the beginning of the war. Until the autumn the situation was more or less stable, but in October it was marked by a sharp decline, which in November turned into a landslide decrease in drilling activity. In January 1941, 159 new wells were commissioned, while in December – only 22 units - 86% lower. If, before mid-spring, Azneftekombinat maintained a fairly high rate of new wells (approximately 150-160 wells per month), then starting from May it showed low rates. In fact, this irresistible decline continued until the end of the year.
This tendency can be explained by a number of objective reasons. In view of the war and the potential threat of air strikes on Baku, it was decided to diversify oil production across the USSR. This decision, in principle, was right. However, in practice the plan was to make sense only with a quick mass transfer of equipment from the oil fields of the Absheron peninsula to the eastern oil regions. As a result, Azneftekombinat faced a sharp reduction of oil machines. We should bear in mind that the mobilization of Soviet industry for the front drastically aggravated the situation with spare parts. Reducing the number of machines increased the load on each remaining piece of equipment. Accordingly, the rate of wear of machine tools had increased, while there was nothing to repair the worn-out units with, and the number of machines "in service" reduced even more. Already in January 1941, about one third of Azerbaijani oil machines needed repair. However, by the end of the year the quantity of unused equipment amounted to almost two-thirds! At the same time the number of working machines fell by 52% during the year. And the situation continued to deteriorate and in January 1942 did not appear to be the 'bottom of the cliff'.
In addition to the lack of oil-producing machinery, Azneftekombinata faced a deficit of a set of other materials and products necessary for the functioning of oil fields. There was a shortage of transport, casing and drill pipes, cement and even the most important equipment - drilling, tubing and casing pipes, mud pumps, etc. It is not surprising that, in this situation, exploratory drilling was eventually completely abandoned. The war ended the supply of the necessary bits, which forced workers to use cutting bits instead. As a result, the rate of mechanical penetration had declined substantially, and this, in turn, increased the inhibitory effect from the reduced commercial rate of penetration caused by organizational reasons. A combination of delays and inadequate instruments produced a cumulative and, unfortunately, purely negative result.
From the beginning of the war, oil producers could count only on themselves. During the war, stocks became one of the main sources of supply and later - the mobilization of domestic resources. In the fourth quarter of 1941 a unit of Azneftekombinata, responsible for the supply of materials and technical resources to the oil refineries (Azneftesnab), organized an inspection of the balance of materials and equipment in warehouses, fields and construction sites. Thus it was possible to find 6795 steel balls of different diameter, 120 tons of raw steel, up to 60 tons of various steel, about 800 kg of carbide, 3 tons of non-ferrous metals, 7 tons of bolts and nuts, 78 thousand rubles worth of hardware, and many other parts and materials that allowed oil production to continue with an almost total lack of centralized supply. The administration of the plant attempted to solve the problem, at least partly, through the recovery of no longer necessary equipment. Following the example of Grozneftekombinat, it tried to solve the lack of casings of 6-8 inches by cutting these pipes from abandoned mines. However, such manoeuvers needed time. Preparing a mine for cutting took about one and a half or two months, while the cutting itself took about 2 or 3 days. In addition, they attempted to broaden the "bottleneck" to the casing at the expense of cutting old drill pipes.
To be continued
Doctor of Historical Sciences, Mikhail Mukhin
