After the discovery of oil fields, Baku became a special place, where various economic and political interests of international coalitions, industrial clans and leaders were concentrated and clashed. VK begins publishing chapters from the book by Ismail Agakishiev "History of the Baku Oil Industry and the Second Oil Boom (second half of the 19th century - beginning of the 20thcentury.)". The book presents a historical analysis of the emergence and current state of the Azerbaijani oil industry.
Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union initially focused on the problem of increasing the production of a particular product, in this case of oil. In the United States much more attention was paid to the compliance of production with the future market needs. The pursuit of quantitative indicators remained in the USSR also during the first five-year plans. At the same targets for development were often determined not based on real possibilities, but on the desire to surpass the corresponding figure in foreign countries. This pursuit caused a number of serious problems in the development of oil industry.
Apparently, the main weak side of the Soviet oil industry in the 1930s was the predatory, absolutely unjustified exploitation of Baku oil depths as well as of other fields of the country. In the pursuit of certain figures, the pumping of crude oil from the upper layers was set as the main direction. But people forgot that this method led to the depletion of reserves, and ultimately - to the emergence of crisis in the production of "black gold". In 1928-29, 1929-30 and the first half of the 1930-31 financial year, the increase in oil production was higher than the figures provided by the five-year plans. In 1928-1929 with the plan to produce 12.7 million tons, 13.7 million tons of oil was produced, while in 1929-30, with the plan to produce 14.4 million tons of oil - 17.3 million. Nowadays it is clear to the experts that the five-year plan was not carried out in absolute terms but in terms of value, because the work costs and the price of the final product were permanently growing during the five-year plan. In addition, according to Igolkin, "the early accomplishment of the plan was made possible not only due to often rush jobs, excessive labor stress and hungry life in order to buy the necessary equipment abroad - but also predatory depletion of resources."
Researchers of the pre-revolutionary period in the development of the oil industry often regard the fountain method of oil recovery as "predatory," although they agree that at that time this method was used less and less. Thus, I. A. Dyakonov writes that the fountain method in the production of Russian oil in 1887 amounted to 42%, in 1900 – to 11.3% and in 1913 - only to 1.8%. However, in the Soviet times the pursuit of high figures has led to the resuscitation of this method and its massive use. In the financial year of 1926-1927 all in all 32.4% of oil was extracted by the fountain method, in 1931 - 42.4%. These factors defined the future problems of the oil industry. One cannot say that oil experts and leadership of the industry did not notice its problems. Dissatisfied with the pace and nature of the main oil center of the country, the Soviet leadership decided to conduct organizational activities in order to improve the situation.
Thus, in July of 1935 a plenum of the Baku Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan on the development of oil industry in the country took place in Baku. It was chaired by the secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the party, L. Beria. His presence and leadership at the plenum was to demonstrate the significance and importance of the event. In his report Beria stressed the rapid development of oil production in Azerbaijan. According to him, it rose from 10.5 million tons in 1930 up to 19.1 million tons in 1934. He commended the performance of other sectors of the industry and stated that the further development of oil industry requires a major reorganization of its leadership. The unified system of Azerbaijani oil industry, combined into a single trust "Azneft", was divided into four separate oil trusts, controlled by the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry of the USSR.
Below I will quote an excerpt from the speech of Beria at the plenum: "The subdivision of the "Azneft" creates the best conditions for the management of the oil economy, and requires each manager, professional and simple worker to perform an even more intensive work on the drilling of each well." 1 An independent oil trust "Azneftehsnab" was created in order to improve the technical and technological supply of the company. Another trust, "Azneftemash" was formed to improve the field of petroleum engineering. In order to better organize the construction works at oil ventures a special organization – "Azneftepromzhilstroy." An independent organization "Azelektrotok" was created in order to provide service to the industry and improve the energy supply of the oil industry. A number of other organizations related to the oil industry were also created.
Later the theme of improving efficiency of oil production was addressed again and again. In February of 1938 a special All-Union meeting of petroleum specialists, headed by the newly appointed head of the Commissariat of the National Heavy Industry, a member of Politburo of the CPSU (b), L. M. Kaganovich took place in Baku. The arrival of Kaganovich and the way the problems of oil industry were discussed at the meeting showed that the deep concerns of the leadership of the country with allegedly insufficient development of oil production. The speech of Kaganovich as well as his numerous conversations with experts and workers present at the meeting showed a desire to understand the reasons that were hindering the development of oil production. However, the commissar believed that the best results could be achieved by encouraging the people.
Thus, in his speech at the meeting a drill master Vanesov said that in order to achieve good results it is enough "to work with people." Kaganovich answered him: "Right." But then Vanesov admitted that often delays were related to the unpreparedness of production for work. When Kaganovich asked about the reasons behind that, Vanesov said that the builders and mounters were to be blamed. Then Kaganovich asked: "Who is obliged to prepare the workplace for the drilling crew?" Vanesov answered: "You would not find any guilty ones here. If you ask the builders they would tell you that the geologists did not set the spots in time and that is why they did not build platform. If you ask the mounters, why they did not assemble a machine they would tell you that they have their own reasons. As a result, the team is walking without a cause." After that question Kaganovich said nothing. The oil master Ryakhina talked about the incoherent work at the oil fields, and that technical reasons lie mainly at the heart of all problems. Although Kaganovich tried to persuade his interlocutor that the dedication of workers is the most important elemet, Ryakhina said: "When we are conducting technical activities, we can see that the well increases the debit of oil."
