Russia is marking the 20th anniversary of the coup of 1991, an attempt to reimpose old Soviet rules and usurp Mikhail Gorbachev’s power. VK interviewed a witness of the events, political analyst Igor Rapoport, who had been involved in the process while working abroad.
- How did you know about the coup attempt in Moscow?
- As usual, on 19 August 1991, early in the morning, I was about to
read a pack of new press, then I turned on the TV to watch the news
from various states. I was surprised and confused when I noticed that
Moscow kept on broadcasting the Swan Lake ballet, while CNN was
broadcasting strange information from Moscow. First of all, certainly,
I mean the city was filled with armored vehicles. I rushed to the
telephone and learned from one of my older mates that the building
where my office had been was surrounded with tanks. I went to our
embassy. There was confusion. Some medium-rank diplomats were watching
the TV. I remember one of them said: “This would, thank god, not take
long, the coup would not seize control of the situation”. We were
invited to the ambassador’s room for an emergency meeting. The point
of what we heard puzzled us – we were urged to avoid giving our own
opinions on the issue. The Foreign Ministry was simply cautious.
Although the ambassador ordered the big portrait of Gorbachev to be
taken down from the front staircase (it was not replaced with
Yanayev). The ambassador’s agility was “praised” by the new government
and he had to suffer for many days in fear of dismissal. However, this
time the danger was over. Several foreign staff members in Western
Europe (particularly, in Portugal) were too fast to express solidarity
with the State Committee for the State of Emergency. Understandably,
their fate went another route.
- Did you follow the orders to avoid expressing your own views on the
Moscow events?
- Personally, I did not take any side. I knew that the Soviet Union
had had no chances of survival (in one form or another) and had only
one path – major reforms and abandonment of the “cold war” practice
and confrontation with the West in general. That is why I responded to
the numerous requests from foreign counterparts to comment on the
state committee and its opponents. First of all the protectors of the
White House. The situation in Moscow provoked NATO's interest. I had a
conversation with the Director General of the Alliance, Manfred
Worner. My advice remains the same – Soviet citizens will resolve
their problems themselves. Western allies should not interfere in our
internal affairs… The State Committee for the State of Emergency
failed very quickly. The portrait of Gorbachev was put back at the
embassy. My wife, children and I visited Moscow and hardly recognized
the post-coup days. I was especially impressed by the barricade that
had still been left near the White House walls. Then I saw a visit of
new emissaries Andrey Kozyrev and Vitaly Churkin, who had informed the
West about the basic policy of the new Russia. We, the Soviet Union,
unfortunately, was living its final days.
