Experts from Moscow, London and Washington on the prospects of nuclear disarmament
It is commonly accepted that in the whole world only USA, Russia, GB, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel possess the technology of nuclear weapons. Despite all US and Russia’s efforts in the area of nuclear disarmament, some experts say that the world might be falling into the new loop of nuclear arms race.
Vladimir Dvorkin, senior scientist of the Institute for World Economy and International Affairs
For more than 10 years proposals on the involvement of France, the UK and China have been appearing. Nuclear disarmament became a religion – some believe in it, others don’t. This issue demands developing bases, relying on which GB and France could be involved in the process. A traditional argument against this is that today Russian and the USA, which are successfully implementing the new START treaty, have many more nuclear arsenals than France or the UK. This is a significant argument, but it shouldn’t prevent the UK and France from involvement in the process. I think the UK has more chances in this case. It is not about a collective treaty, but about collective measures that could be connected with a certain transparency. The UK is a perfect example of such transparency. The point is not only that nuclear powers have to fulfil their duties in the sphere of non-proliferation, negotiations on nuclear disarmament and so on, the point is that demonstration of transparency with the possibility of verification of the nuclear policy could be acceptable for France and the UK. They could take a small part of those transparency measures that existed between the USSR/Russia and the USA within START-1 and exist within START-3. The new treaty includes about 150 notifications on the nuclear armaments of Russia and the US. It seems to me a part of these measures, at least 10 out of 150 notifications between Russia and the US… For example, the notification on the current situation in the nuclear sphere, on launching and withdrawing nuclear facilities, on the nuclear infrastructure facilities, on war games, on launching training and test missiles.
Malcolm Chalmers, Research Director and Director (UK Defence Policy) at RUSI
The UK is a country that always signs under treaties on nuclear disarmament and reduces its number of nuclear missiles, as well as Russia. As for the promotion of the process, the UK has actively insisted on talks between five recognized nuclear powers. China is involved in the process too. We should see what these new countries could do for promotion of the nuclear disarmament process. There are many interesting ideas presented by General Dvorkin on enhancement of transparency. I think we could discuss details of them. Five powers. There are certain problems, if we speak about China. Today nobody says seriously that tye UK or France are enhancing their nuclear arsenals, but there are doubts about China. Considering the development of strategic international relations, it would be important to involve China in this process too. If some measures proposed by Mr. Dvorkin could be taken, for example, information exchange, I think these measures should be taken by other recognized nuclear powers too. It would be easier, if five countries agree. I think it is more difficult to involve France and the UK without China. At the moment it is very important for all five powers to participate in the process. Since 2009-2010, the UK, France and the USA reported about the general capacity of their nuclear arsenals. It is important for Russia to consider it, as START-3 doesn’t include a significant number of systems. British systems are not included either, and none of the French systems can be included there either. Thus, if all five nuclear powers announce the general capacity of their nuclear arsenals, we will see whether arsenals are reducing or growing.
Sergey Oznobischev, professor MGIMO
China has different arguments, a different geopolitical situation. But this doesn’t relieve it of responsibility on declaring a move to the denuclearized world. If we have joined this process, it becomes our responsibility. And everyone should feel it is a responsibility. I think both Russia and the UK feel it. Not long ago, Prime Minister Brown said that the UK supports the idea of a denuclearized world. So now experts should propose the way we will choose for moving to it. Recently we held a session in the Institute for World Economy within the program of the Nuclear Threat Initiative Fund. I’ve brought the materials on our previous sessions, and soon new materials on the last conference will be published. The conference touched on the involvement of France and the UK. The discussion was based on the outstanding article by Professor Chalmers. And we tried to feel for first approaches, some of them were mentioned by General Dvorkin. However, we are very far from first actions, because there is no mechanism. We have experts’ proposals, but no mechanism. There are a lot of discussions within international organizations, but what it will be… Maybe it will be a special envoy of the UN, who will unite everyone and draw attention to the issue. Something global is coming into my mind. A combination of attraction mechanisms and politically-interesting forums. At the moment the situation seems to be paradoxical. We are living in the 21st century, we have difficult challenges and threats which are hard to resist using nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, we have it, we get rid of it unwillingly. And it is happening within sight of some countries of the world that, unfortunately, strive for possession of nuclear weapons. The biggest threat hidden in our do-nothing or slow progress to a denuclearized world is that we show a bad example to these countries. They think that if some countries have nuclear weapons and they provide their national security through it, it is acceptable to possess nuclear weapons too. China is the most shut-down country in this sphere. I agree with Professor Chalmers that we should think together about the first steps on involving all five nuclear powers into limiting and reducing strategic nuclear armaments.
Paul Shult, senior scientist of the Nuclear Policy Program under the Carnegie Fund
Regarding official negotiations with China, they show that the Chinese do not want to participate in anything. And they do not take duties to limit their nuclear arsenals. We should try to influence and change their interests. What would it look like, when China agrees to participate in the process at last? What logics should be promoted in relations between China, the nuclear powers, NATO and Russia? Special work should be carried out. A special vision should be proposed, i.e. a formula that includes all countries in their places. We shouldn’t forget about the Western mentality. We should think about the balance of mentalities of different countries.
Vladimir Dvorkin, senior scientist of the Institute for World Economy and International Affairs
China is the most shut-down nuclear country. I think it would be unreasonable to involve all five nuclear powers in the process of limitation of nuclear weapons. China is closed, and there are grounds to think that it has larger nuclear arsenals than the Stockholm Institute demonstrates. We proceeded from the amount of arms materials produced by China. We think it doesn’t store the materials, but has used them for increasing nuclear missiles, both strategic and non-strategic. But it is a mistake to start the process by all five countries, I think. Why do I insist on measures that could be taken by GB and France? They could provide a certain impetus. If Great Britain and France announce they are ready to take several measures of transparency, which we have discussed (150 notifications between Russia and the USA) and urge China to make the same steps, it would be a positive push. In this case, China will have fewer chances to ignore the situation, because GB and France, according to expert appraisals, have volumes of nuclear weapons similar to the Chinese. France and GB should make a push, for China to react to the situation. It might take fewer transparency measures in comparison with France and Great Britain, but it will have to take at least some of them.
Malcolm Chalmers, Research Director and Director (UK Defence Policy) at RUSI
I think we should remind ourselves that the absence of balance is an important issue. However, nuclear arsenals of different countries cannot be equal. I think arsenals won’t be really needed for containment; and we won’t be aware about precise capacities, but some hints might become clear, but we won’t learn about the precise volumes of nuclear arsenals of each country. However, today GB has less than 200 missiles, France – less than 300 missiles, China has probably the same level, while the USA proclaims to have more than 5,000 missiles. Some say Russia has the same number of missiles, others think the number is bigger. Therefore, when the arsenals of the USA and Russia are 15-20 times greater than the nuclear arsenals of China, France and GB, France and GB should say: “If you stop enhancing your arsenals and begin reducing them, we will do the same.” More transparency is required. Nuclear arsenals should be reduced, or at least it should be stated they won’t be enhanced. The process is staged. Of course, GB and France are concerned about the ghosts of the past in Russia that it could speak about the balance between Russia and the NATO. We cannot say whether the US will accept it, because in this case it will appear in a weaker position than Russia. I think General Dvorkin meant it, when he spoke about transparency. And I see no problem for France and GB taking many of the proposed measures on informing for promoting the process. Of course, it won’t be easy, and the process should be adapted to certain conditions in France and Great Britain. And if the process is launched, it will give a motivation to China, because when you see two nuclear powers situated in a secure part of the world… As for China, international concerns are caused by a possible growth of its nuclear potential. And many people think about an armaments race in India, considering its relations with Pakistan. But GB and France, I think, will be involved in the process and reach their targets.
Paul Shult, senior scientist of the Nuclear Policy Program under the Carnegie Fund
I see the British and French positions as that our two countries have no reasons to stand against growing transparency. But regarding negotiations between the USA and Russia, you know that Britain and France are allergic to some written duties as major nuclear powers. The problem is about the nuclear balance and that the US and France try to solve the problem by some different means. It is important to consider international necessities. Today GB is dealing with it. But the conditions should be separated diplomatically from negotiations between Russia and the USA. The process will continue until the current figures are reduced. China will speak about it. It is interesting to discuss a reduction of nuclear arsenals, but some countries have no opportunities for it. It doesn’t mean we cannot do something simultaneously. The point is not in figures, but in the atmosphere and strategic attitude. It is important for major countries to consolidate to reduce nuclear armaments to an acceptable level.
Vladimir Dvorkin, senior scientist of the Institute for World Economy and International Affairs
Russia and the US could continue talks on a new treaty. Our project, which is developed together with the NTI, shows there is an opportunity to agree on reduction of missiles down to 1000 items. But here the unresolved problem of the European missile defense system appears. It influences the whole process of nuclear disarmament. I won’t speak about ways of solving the problem, there are proposals and certain optimism that in the end we will settle the problem. But if we look at the problem from the Chinese point of view: how will China react to the Aegis system in the Far East? This factor will prevent China from taking the transparency measures proposed by GB and France. However, a push is essential, as we need to find out what aspects might prevent China from participation. We should make China discuss these problems, because, I repeat, it is the most shut-down nuclear power, and there are grounds to think it has a larger nuclear arsenal than the Stockholm Institute presents, whose data we sometimes use along with ours, of course. This is the problem. I emphasize, we aren’t speaking about a reduction of the nuclear arsenals of GB and France. We are speaking about transparency only, extended transparency.
Paul Shult, senior scientist of the Nuclear Policy Program under the Carnegie Fund
What is the best thing about nuclear zero? The world will be entirely different, if we achieve it. At the same time, the process of reaching zero would stimulate the planet to solve the problem. It doesn’t mean it will settle other problems, arguments or provocations either. And this is the best thing about the option of “global zero.” The point is in balance and national security. What is sufficient for the national security of a country and provides greater transparency at the same time? The concept of transparency is important for strategic nuclear weapons, I mean their amount and location. It concerns common nuclear weapons too. All these problems will have to be solved. This is the problem. But it is the best thing for it.the UK.
