By Musa Musayev, exclusively to VK
Moscow’s initiative regarding the restoration of the governors’ elections became the most discussed topic on the North Caucasus. This discussion started well before the presidential elections. Another initiative of the Kremlin – the so-called ‘presidential filter’ – added fuel to the fire. According to its opponents this ‘filter’ is unconstitutional as well as the very strict ‘vertical line’ of power.
However, the media and the experts also point out that the dismantlement of this ‘vertical line’ could have serious consequences: the aggravation of the dispute between the supporters of this dismantlement (the opposition) and the members of the ruling administration (that stands for the preservation of the chain of command, but doesn’t dare to support it openly as the initiative comes from the President himself) is quite possible. However, it is regrettable that this face-off takes place in lobbies, and not in the public parliamentary discussions. And on the North Caucasus extra-parliamentary face-off might turn into a serious conflict.
The traditional use of administrative and financial resources to influence the outcome of the elections could seriously destabilize the situation on the North Caucasus. For example, in Dagestan even during the municipal elections there were some shoot-outs, murders and fights between different candidates’ supporters (even armed fights!). The violations of the election law and voters’ rights were extremely wide-spread, but the central authorities didn’t even tried to stop the candidates who were involved into criminal showdowns from participating in the elections. So the massive violations during the elections might cause the abolishment of the election’s results in generals, but they never end in punishment of the criminals.
In case of governors’ elections the situation might get only worse, if the elites won’t be able to reach an agreement. In the post-Soviet history the head of the Dagestani government has never been elected. It is unknown how would the popular elections end in 2006, if they were not abolished. The campaigning started 2 years before the actual date of the elections, and the tension was growing ever since. The forces of the opposition organized protest actions demanding immediate resignation of the then head of the republic, Magomedali Magomedov.
There is yet another specific trait of the North Caucasian policy: in Chechnya and Ingushetia the big families, the clans are called ‘teypes’, and in Dagestan they are called ‘tukhums’. National elites are all members of powerful tukhums. And the tukhums are competing for political influence. So it is hard to create a true chain of command in these conditions. The ethnic communities in Dagestan are rather closed structures, but within them there are certain rules of conduct, so any state official has to win the leader of each of these numerous communities over. And if one tries to ignore these leaders or to deprive them from their privileges they can gather their supporters to stand up to the official power. Different tukhums take up different areas of professional activity, from agriculture and business to criminal and militant activities.
In the most restless republics of the NCFD – Dagestan and Ingushetia – not all teypes and tukhums are arranged according to the ‘vertical line’, as the rivalry still prevails among them. However, in the last years the area of militant activity increased and now includes Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachayevo-Cherkessia, while after Yevkurov came to power in Ingushetia this republic became relatively calmer. The secret of this successful policy is that Yevkurov doesn’t try to ‘fight the terrorism’, instead he tries to reconcile the teypes and consolidate Ingush people, as well as allows the media to criticize his policy.
In Dagestan the situation is hard: not political parties and programs compete there for power, but groups of armed people who are blood relatives. This situation makes the principles of ‘separation of powers’ and the separation of business from state administration quite impossible to implement. And there are also inter-ethnic tensions in Dagestan. So the pre-election campaigning might lead to activization of the militant underground there. Dagestan is a very complex territory, where 90% of the inhabitants profess Islam, but the Ummah is still divided according to the ethnic and clan principles.
All in all, today the North Caucasus public perceives the governors elections in two opposite ways: as an additional destabilization factor or as a step towards final stabilization. Some say that the elections are not the problem, the problem is the lack of initiative and ability of the local power to conduct these elections. The supporters of the ‘vertical line of power’ dismantlement believe that the new elections may lead to the complete change of elites and would give new political figures an opportunity to conduct real reforms.
