VK talked to political scientist and Director of the Caucasus Institute, Alexander Iskandaryan about his report entitled "Security of Armenia: Challenges, Expectations, Realities".
Armenia has actually two neighbors. In fact, there are more on the map, three more: the two recognized ones are Turkey and Azerbaijan, the unacknowledged one is Karabakh. But this is not a big deal, because Turkey and Azerbaijan are not close to Armenia for obvious reasons, and Karabakh in every sense except the political one, that is, in the economic, demographic, social, spiritual sense, what you want - it's actually pretty much a part of Armenia. Accordingly, there are Georgia and Iran – with the very specific, I would say, format of Iranian-US relations, and no less specific format of Georgian-Russian relations. With the utmost importance for Armenia, of course, of the U.S. and Russia, there is a picture in which Armenia is obliged to act like Mikoyan from the famous Soviet joke, arriving dry to a Politburo meeting and saying that he walked between the raindrops. This is a constant of Armenian foreign policy. It does not depend on any election year. In the Armenian foreign policy rhetoric it is called complimentarism. This is the official position. Armenia does not equate anti-Western and pro-Russian or pro-Western and anti-Russian and is trying to maintain the policy – that is, every time, doing something with Iran, we say to the Americans "Look at the map, guys," and we say the same thing every time to the Russians doing something with the Georgians. This is real, and this is a challenge. It does not depend on the individual, no matter who was elected president of Armenia in this election, or what you like - it will remain constant. What is the mode of the formation of Armenian security, the security of the Republic of Armenia? There are several components. Military and political cooperation with Russia in the CSTO, i.e. the ability to provide arms ammunition at affordable prices, this is a Russian military base in Armenia, which takes challenges existing in the region associated with third countries, and it is the presence of quite serious armies in Armenia and Karabakh, which must ensure the security of a purely military level because of the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Politically, this is the format of the Minsk process, which is much criticized, in my opinion - quite unfairly. The Minsk process in politics - I'm a political scientist, I am not a politician, so I can say what I really think - the Minsk process does not have the goal of resolving the conflict. Resolving the Karabakh conflict cannot be implemented so far. The parties' positions diverge so much that compromise is impossible there. We do not have anything to negotiate. Accordingly, the Minsk process has three objectives. The first task - I would call it «show must go on». Negotiations should continue. World experience shows that in the conflicts in which there is a channel of interaction between the parties, the situation is developing better than in those that do not have this channel. The second problem - the process should be internationalized, so to speak, so in the room there will be not only Azerbaijani and Armenian, but also American, French and Russian. And thirdly, we need to continue a peaceful solution to the conflict and negotiations around it, and the Minsk Group has been performing these tasks quite well since 1992. Accordingly, the Minsk process will remain in the sphere of military-political security. Eurasian Economic Community, the EAC, the CES, the Customs Union - all these many emerging, very different bodies, with different approaches, media formats and so on, are not rejected, and we try to combine them with the formats of the West. There is the format of the Eastern Partnership. This year for Armenia is very important in this sense. In November the Vilnius summit will be held, and at the Vilnius summit an agreement on associate membership in the EU may be initialled. Negotiations are going on for the deep zone of mutual trade. By June, there will be the facilitating of the visa regime. These formats are combined with those that we have with Russia. It’s not that easy, but understanding everywhere, including in Europe, is possible. The Armenian and not only the Armenian press discusses this quite violently. These formats are perceived as conflicting. If you follow the advice of Professor Preobrazhensky and don't read newspapers before dinner, then at the real political level all is fairly decent. Most recently, the President of Armenia, the newly-elected but the old one, before his inauguration visited Moscow, met with Putin. In general, it seems that the format of cooperation with the Customs Union and the EAC is quite possible with combining the formats that exist in other areas. These are our expectations for the next 5 to 7 years. Our challenges are also fairly clear: these are challenges of regional isolation, communication isolation. There is some hope on the Abkhaz railway, which is a problem, but there is not zero probability that in the medium term some minimal opportunities could appear. The Armenian-Turkish process to date has died, or at least very much frozen up, I think, until 2014-2015. Again, the chance that somehow it will be unlocked is zero. At the same time, I think that the chance that the situation in Iran will be risky is also equal to zero. So the process that we have now will continue with some of the developments in different directions. We should not expect anything miraculous. But the mode or the locus of the policy that exists in our country concerning external players - again, I go back to the beginning, it cannot change. It will be more or less the same, and developing it is the task of the Armenian authorities to date. More integration with Russia, more integration with Europe, even more integration with the world around, which is not very easy, but attempts to do so will continue.
