By Oleg Kusov for Vestnik Kavkaza
The three-day visit of Heydar Aliyev to Moscow – Azerbaijan joins the CIS as a fully-fledged member – The Nagorno-Karabakh cease-fire agreement – Another round of Russian-Georgian negotiations on signing of an interstate agreement – Failed attempts to persuade Shaverdnadze to join the CIS – Assault by Abkhaz armed groups – Siege of Sukhumi – Execution of the pro-Georgian government of Abkhazia – End of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.
Azerbaijan joins the CIS
September 5. Azerbaijani acting President Heydar Aliyev made a three-day visit to Moscow. It was the first official foreign visit of Heydar Aliyev as the head of an independent Azerbaijan. He met Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin, Chairman of the Supreme Council Ruslan Khasbulatov, Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev. According to Heydar Aliyev, the visit was “a correction of mistakes made by the old authorities of the republic in relations with Russia.”
September 6. Iran demanded that Armenia withdraw its forces from Azerbaijan, stating that it would not tolerate “further aggression near its border.”
The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh continued to deteriorate. Armenian armed formations started a military operation in the Nakhchivan Region. Iranian forces had to cross the border of the autonomous republic to protect dams on the River Araks and build several camps for Azerbaijani refugees. Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan said in a telephone conversation with his Iranian counterpart that he expected no more attacks from Stepanakert.
Two Turkish military bases sent soldiers to the Armenian border. Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller said that the soldiers will fight for Azerbaijan, unless Armenia discontinued the assault of Karabakh. The Kremlin expressed discontent with the initiatives of Tehran and Ankara. The Karabakh war could escalate. The situation depended on the Azerbaijani leader, who prevented the involvement of Iranian and Turkish forces in the conflict.
Vladimir Kazimirov, Russian Plenipotentiary Presidential Envoy to Nagorno-Karabakh and co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, achieved a temporary cease-fire that lasted until November 1993.
September 9. Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller visited Baku on the way to Moscow. She expressed readiness to intensify cooperation with Azerbaijan during negotiations with Heydar Aliyev.
September 13. Moscow hosted talks between Azerbaijani Vice Speaker of Parliament Adiyaddin Jalilov and Nagorno-Karabakh Foreign Minister Arkady Gukasyan. Jalilov met Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Adamishin.
September 14. The Russian Foreign Ministry praised direct negotiations between Baku and Stepanakert and emphasized the cease-fire agreement until October 5.
September 15. Boris Yeltsin and Levon Ter-Petrosyan met in the Kremlin. They discussed the cease-fire for the Nagorno-Karabakh. According to some sources, the Armenian president was expecting the Kremlin to protect Armenia from Tehran and Ankara.
September 16. The Azerbaijani Defense Ministry said that Armenian forces had violated the cease-fire agreement and bombarded Kazakh at night. The high flow of refugees to Baku provoked a food deficit. Heydar Aliyev requested aid from Turkey and Iran.
An Azerbaijani combat helicopter flying from Nakhchivan to the Zangelan District was attacked from the ground and was forced to land in Iran. Iran sent its crew and passengers home.
The Azerbaijani leader had a meeting with Strobe Talbott, Special Adviser to the Secretary of State on the Newly-Independent States. The US official said that his country was focusing on the “problem of legitimacy of power” in Baku, calling Elchibey the legitimate president. Analysts were confident that such a position was an expression of US discontent with the actions of Aliyev, who had nullified agreements on oil development signed by Elchibey and a set of Western corporations.
September 20. The Azerbaijani parliament gave 31 votes for and 13 against joining the CIS.
September 21. The parliament lifted the state of emergency in Azerbaijan (active since April 2, 1993).
September 24. Azerbaijan joined the CIS as a fully-fledged member and joined the Collective Security Treaty Organization.
September 25. Moscow hosted a meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents. They exchanged opinions. The Armenian leader discussed the key role of Russia in settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Tbilisi loses Abkhaz war
In late July, Georgian, Abkhaz and Russian diplomats signed the Sochi Ceasefire Agreement. According to the document, the sides were to cease fire, Georgia was to withdraw its forces from Abkhazia and the Abkhaz authorities were to return from Gudaut to Sukhumi. Meanwhile, armed supporters of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who had lost power, activated under the leadership of Loti Kobalia in West Georgia. They took over Senaki, Abashu and Khobi by the end of August.
Boris Pastukhov, Russian Presidential Envoy for Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict, told members of the Abkhaz parliament in July that their forces should approach Sukhumi, but must not attack the city. The Abkhaz government said that the agreement had ruined the attack on Sukhumi.
September 1. Chairman of the Georgian State Council Eduard Shevardnadze and Russian Defense Minister met in Tbilisi and discussed the “greater Russian-Georgian treaty” and membership of Georgia in the CIS and Russian bases in Akhalkalaki, Batumi and Tbilisi. Shevardnadze promised to let them operate, but gave no promises about joining the CIS.
September 7. Russia and Georgia start the fifth round of talks on signing an interstate agreement and Georgia joining the CIS. Tbilisi was refusing to join the CIS. Loti Kobalia took over Gali and the Galsky District.
September 9. The talks ended with no significant results.
September 14. Shevardnadze proposed imposing a state of emergency in Georgia and halt any activities of the parliament for about three months. MPs were outraged by such an initiative. Shevardnadze filed his resignation, but it was not approved. The parliament accepted his proposals later.
Gamsakhurdia’s supporters started a new assault against Georgian government forces and blocked the Batumi-Tbilisi-Railway. The Georgian leader visited Kutaisi.
September 16. Abkhaz armed formations started an offensive operation in the eastern and western areas of the republic. The Tamysh Bridge was destroyed in the Ochamchir District. Clashes with Georgian armed groups started. Abkhaz groups crossed the River Gumista, reaching the western outskirts of Sukhumi. Then the main forces of the Abkhaz army stationed on strategic highland areas started the siege of Sukhumi.
Pastukhov, the Russian Presidential Envoy, arrived in Tbilisi to persuade Shevardnadze that Moscow was demanding that the Abkhaz side stop the assault. NATO criticized Russia for backing Abkhaz groups.
On the evening of September 16, supporters of Gamsakhurdia reached Poti and sent an ultimatum demanding the surrender of the city at 3.00 pm the following day.
Shevardnadze wrote a letter to Yeltsin, asking: “What have we done wrong to Russia and the world?.. We were disarmed and it happened because we trusted you.” Speaker of the Georgian Parliament Vakhtang Goguadze sent a harsher letter, predicting an apocalyptic catastrophe for Russia, because “all the world will turn away from it because of its policy.”
September 20. Abkhaz forces block the Sukhumi-Ochamchir Highway. Fights start on the outskirts of Sukhumi.
Russia passed economic sanctions against Abkhazia.
September 22. Abkhaz armed forces started an assault on Sukhumi. A Georgian armed unit was surrounded at the railway station. The Mayak District was taken over.
September 23. Sukhumi Airport was blockaded. The Abkhaz military shot down three Tu-154s and Tu-134s. The Abkhaz side said that they were piloted by Georgians and Ukrainian mercenaries.
September 24. Zviad Gamsakhurdia arrived from Grozny to Senaki in the western part of Georgia on a helicopter. There is a theory that the Russian authorities offered him to become the head of the Mingrelian State and offered military aid. But Gamsakhurdia refused and wanted to become the head of Georgia.
September 25-27. Abkhaz and North Caucasian formations continued moving towards the government of acting Prime Minister Jiuli Shartava. The Russian Black Sea Fleet evacuated residents and mercenaries. Many tried to break through to the east, to the Kodori Gorge.
September 27. Eduard Shevardnadze was moved from Sukhumi. There are several theories about his rescue, all involving Russian aid in saving the official.
An armed formation of Kabards captured the government and handed 17 pro-Georgian ministers to Shartava. They were executed under unknown circumstances.
Georgian MPs started an emergency session to discuss Georgian membership of the CIS.
September 30. The Abkhaz armed formations were in control of almost all the territory of Abkhazia (except the Kodori Gorge). 250,000 Georgians fled the republic.
A lot has been said and written about the causes of the Georgian defeat in September 1993. The most popular one in Georgia is the “felinity of the Kremlin” that forced Georgian formations to disarm in the middle of the month and left Sukhumi unprotected from trained units from Abkhazia and the North Caucasus.
Russian experts have a different version. They say that Moscow lost control over the conflict in mid-September, because its internal political crisis was escalating. Boris Yeltsin signed order N1400, dissolving the Supreme Council and the Congress of People’s Deputies. Russia was on the edge of civil war itself. 12 days were left before the siege of the Russian parliament. The Abkhaz side probably made use of the circumstance.
Sukhumi says that Moscow was interfering in the Abkhaz progress and prevented the Abkhaz forces from finishing the enemy off faster. This is why the Kremlin convinced the sides to sign a trilateral agreement and blocked the border on River Psou on September 20. The Abkhaz authorities insist that they could have taken over Sukhumi back in July 1993 if it were not for Moscow's interference.
Persistent demands by the Kremlin in the summer and autumn of 1993 to have Tbilisi become a member of the CIS, allow Russian military bases to stay and quit a pro-Western orientation remained a fact. Could they persuade Shevardnadze to fulfil the demands (temporarily, as we know) without an armed conflict with Abkhazia and an active assault by Gamsakhurdia in Mingrelia? Shevardnadze could handle political battles with the Kremlin, but he could not achieve success with a decaying army where, according to witnesses, “soldiers were sending generals to buy them cigarettes.” Moreover, his army had to fight with well-trained Chechen soldiers, and others from Kabardino-Balkaria and North Ossetia.
