Viktoria Panfilova, observer of NG. Exclusively to Vestnik Kavkaza
Today the non-governmental organization Eurasian Choice of Georgia is going to hold a demonstration in Tbilisi. Its participants will walk from Rustaveli Avenue to the building of the Foreign Ministry and state on necessity to restore diplomatic relations with Russia.
The other demand of Georgian Russophiles concerns conducting new referendums on joining NATO and the EU and the Common Economic Area (CEA). According to them, the results of all previous referendums are wrong. First of all, they are out of date. Secondly, it is difficult to call them free will expression because repressive policy of previous authorities toward people who think different prevented any truthful result. Today the atmosphere in Georgia is different; it is freer, and so it should be proved that the population really supports the Western foreign political orientation of the country, or Russia and its integration projects.
The atmosphere in Georgia has changed for sure. For example, according to one of the polls, more than 60% of respondents support joining the EurAsEU. However, some other Georgian media assumed that respondents confused abbreviations. At the same time, it was impossible to imagine a pro-Russian demonstration in Tbilisi a year ago. Its participants, not mentioning initiators, would be labeled as agents of the Kremlin. And the whole idea of pro-Russian orientation was not popular among the population. It is not dominating now as well. But some examples can confirm that the striving for north is alive.
Of course it concerns messages by the Georgian Orthodox Church, its direct urges to forget contradictions and normalize relations with Orthodox brothers. Church is a traditionally respectful force in Georgia, and the GOC is the most effective resource for shifting the society toward Russia. Other examples of “pro-Russian demonstration” are less effective.
An attempt by the former national security minister Valery Khaburdzania to form a pro-Russian political force seems to have failed. His statement wasn’t supported by anything significant. Some separate phrases by the new Georgian authorities on possibility of joining the Eurasian or Customs Unions, if it is probable, shouldn’t be considered seriously because sometime later the topic begins to be discussed in the context that an author of the statement is misunderstood, while the phrase is misinterpreted.
The presidency candidate Nino Burdzhanadze stays separate. The former speaker bets on necessity of good-neighborly relations with Russia under reduction of influence of the U.S. and the West on Georgia. However, Burdzhanadze's direct pro-Russian position is explained not by sincere striving for Moscow, but by an attempt to act pragmatically. The logic is simple: Abkhazia and South Ossetia cannot be returned under awful relations with Russia, so probably there are more chances to do it under normal relations with it. The fact that President Putin and Premier Medvedev have many times stated that Russia won’t deny independence of the former Georgian autonomies is ignored.
The same logic is typical for the coalition of Eurasian Choice of Georgia. Its head Archil Chkoidze thinks that Georgia should take a pattern by Japan which has unsettled territorial problems with Russia, but diplomatic relations are not broken. Reconstruction of diplomatic relation would positive influence the visa regime between Russia and Georgia.
Georgia terminated the visa regime for convenience with more than 100 countries. It was done to promote tourism. The Georgian authorities hoped that the West would appreciate Tbilisi’s striving and cancel or at least simplify the visa regime as well. But it didn’t happen, and it couldn’t be.
European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Stefan Fule stated that the association agreement could be signed with Georgia only in a year after the Eastern Partnership in Vilnius in November 2013. So, the EU is ready to sign the association agreement with the strategic partner of Russia, Armenia, in Vilnius, while with the most pro-Western country of the post-Soviet space, Georgia, only in a year after the summit. What is the point in Saakashvili’s pro-Western policy, if the most pro-Russian country of the former USSR, Armenia, is in advance of the most pro-Western country in the sphere of ties with the EU?
The uncertainty in relations with the EU and NATO, intensification of pro-Russian forces in Georgia and possible success in the presidential elections of the pro-Russian candidate mean that the future of Georgia is not as certain as it seemed sometime ago. And probably a battle between Moscow and the West for involvement of Tbilisi into their orbit hasn’t begun yet.
