By Musa Musayev, Makhachkala. Exclusively for Vestnik Kavkaza
Considering the information space of Russia, a calm period took place in the North Caucasus last month, even though recently explosions and gun-fights were numerous in the region. Has the violence been stopped? No, the region simply fell out of the information space. An illusion of stability appeared. The reality was different. Special operations took place, but the mass media didn’t report about them. According to journalists, the mass media got an unvoiced order to close its eyes to crimes during the Olympic Games. At the same time, there really were no terrorist attacks and armed attacks on the police in the period.
Doubtlessly, stability in the North Caucasus does not only depend on the numbers of militants (they would still be recruited), the layout of political forces in Moscow and Makhachkala plays an essential role. Different forces use the situation in Dagestan as a political asset, depending on the government level, to press on the decision-making centers at just the right moment. Some experts speculate that the two wars in Chechnya and the sluggish in Dagestan are a result of struggles for power in Moscow.
Dagestan can be used to launch the mechanism of internal conflicts from the inside. This is the explanation to the informal status of Dagestan and the negligence the central government shows towards its problems. The republic is indeed the largest, in terms of territory and population, but its elites are scattered, the political fight on the federal and republican level forms confusing interethnic and religious controversies. This tones down the lobbying potential of the republic’s authorities in attracting federal investments. On the other hand, the backstage fight for power prevents Moscow and Makhachkala authorities from consolidating their political will into a single fist and using it to achieve stability.
The political confrontation continues between “liberals” and “those in favour of string state control.” The processes happening in Dagestan over the past 23 years justify the impression that the struggle continues with mixed results. Under President Boris Yeltsin’s democratic rule, Dagestan was moving away from Russia, despite the will of its population and elites. Centrifugal processes started in Dagestan itself. National movements and aggressive clans with their own armed militia appeared. The interior political conflict between the tradition and untraditional Islam aggravated dramatically. The positions of the latter have been greatly enforced in the past years. The confrontation culminated in 1999 when militants from Chechnya entered Dagestan, foreboding war. Victor Stepashin said back then: “We have lost Dagestan.” However, seeing what was happening in the “independent Ichkeria,” the population of Dagestan did not allow the militants from the neighbour republic to enter.
Militia groups started forming in the near-border areas. Vladimir Putin came to power just at this moment and the positions of militants became stronger. Basayev guerillas were driven out of Dagestan and neutralized in Chechnya. None the less, some law enforcers and followers of the traditional Islam have started abusing their monopolistic rights for the violence market. As a result, both militants and all Muslims opposed to the traditional Islam started joining underground resistance. The government provoked some of its opponents to join resistance groups as well.
After the switch of power in Dagestan in 2006 and presidential polls in Russia in 2008, the crime, religious and political situation in Dagestan started changing. Mukhu Aliyev became the head of Dagestan and Dmitry Medvedev the president of Russia focused on liberal forces. Forces opposed to the traditional official clergy of Islam and human rights organizations beefed up in Dagestan. Visually, the number of religious men with beards and women in hijabs grew.
The religious conflict escalated, followers of both Islamic branches were suffering casualties. The war zone was expanding towards the southern districts, the quiet Tsuntinsky and relatively peaceful Kizlyarsky districts. Both low-ranking law enforcers and their authorities, functionaries and religious figures looked upon as immortals were dying. Dagestani Interior Minister Adilgerey Magomedtagirov was killed. Terrorist attacks and armed attacks were fatal for prominent sufi sheikhs, such as Sayid Afandi Chirkeysky and Sirajun Khurigsky. Rector of the Technological University Maksoud Sadykhov and about 40 outstanding Sufis shared their fate.
Law enforcers started regaining their positions after the return of Vladimir Putin to presidency. Groups of the Interior Ministry and the Defense Ministry were moved from Chechnya to Dagestan. Additional police units were formed in areas with especially intense militant activity. 2013 was a breakthrough in the fight with militants because many of them were killed and the police started checking functionaries suspected of supporting resistance. If this tendency continues and mass combing of own ranks succeeds, Dagestan may finally leave the information space as a subject of growing terrorism and extremism.
