Alexei Vlasov exclusively to Vestnik Kavkaza
It is well-known that in the national republics of the USSR new forces began to be evoked that were dangerous for the top authorities movements to be formed. Thoughtful work had to be provided in this sphere and new models of relations between the center and the republics had to appear. Apparently if the signal had been recognized in a right way, a lot of tragic events in the history of the late USSR could be avoided: from Tbilisi to Baku.
However, new challenges and risks were almost ignored, i.e. they were settled in a traditional manner which couldn’t provide the huge country with demanded stability. Fires of ethnic tension began to appear at its periphery.
One of such flash-points was Azerbaijan where the People’s Front of the republic organized a movement. On January 20 Gorbachev launched the state of emergency in Baku. It is interesting that the order was a rude violation of the USSR constitution according which required permission of the Supreme Council of the union republic for launching the state of emergency as an obligatory condition. No permission was given by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan.
Nevertheless. At night from the 19th to the 20th of January Baku saw an outrageous act of violence. What are the reasons for this tragic mistake which is worse than a mistake, it is a crime, according to many contemporary politicians. Deep methodological miscount is over water. It resembles factors of the economic crisis of the Soviet system – inconsistency of the plan economy with radical renewal of key funds of the majority of enterprises in the early 1980s, demands of modernizations at the level of modern technologies. It would lead to a systemic stop, i.e. violation of the planned duties fulfillment program.
In the situation of establishing new ethnic policy the authorities prefer to maintain external stability, avoiding abrupt movements, a dialogue with ethnic intelligentsia, and work with young people. The problems which existed for several decades were forced into the depth of the system, even though their settlement required absolutely different approached.
The ethnic policy of the USSR was contradictory from the very beginning. Today many contemporaries of that events, former party top officials, special services’ employees, journalists, writers are trying to find an external explanation of the fact of ethnic tensions. Let’s leave conspiracy theories alone. We have to find our own answer to the question “How could friendship turn into hatred in such a short term, if no phenomena of ethnic hatred and non-tolerance were marked in communication between average Soviet people?”
The ethnic issue is a thin fabric, and there are only two ways of its settlement: cruel oppression of any attempts to reconsider things in a way different from the official ideology – the Soviet people as a new historic unity – or maximal consideration of all specific features of every ethnic group’s development. Until the Stalin system oppressed any expressions of “bourgeois nationalism,” mechanisms of ethnic relations functioned within this logic. The Thaw Period and the period of Stagnation relaxed screw vise, but didn’t offer anything instead of it, except for using strict policy when the ethnic elite or intelligentsia in the union republics broke the rules of the game.
Average people were far away from this; they built their relations as neighbors. At the same time they preserved ethnic identity, even though they lost a significant part of ethnic customs, culture, traditions, and language. At the same time, the ethnic factor didn’t disappear. It wasn’t marked until certain time. It seems the events of January 1990 crossed reforming of the system completely, as well as a possibility of maintaining the Soviet Union.
It should be remembered. The mistakes and miscounts of the Soviet authorities should be avoided by the current officials.
