James Nixey, Manager and Research Fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, the London-based think-tank.
- How do you rate the perspectives of Abkhazia’s existence as an independent state?
- Abkhazia has state potential but it is not yet ready. But it does have potential in contrast to South Ossetia, which is not yet ready and does not have potential. So these two things are very different. However, why does it have potential? Because of the decent-sized population, because it has the beginnings of a democratic process, because it has an economy with natural resources, which can be exploited for development, and its human resources. Also, the degree of corruption is not as great as it is in South Ossetia. There is some possibility for true state potential, if it has less dependence on Russia; no Russians within the government of Abkhazia and probably no Russian peacekeepers on the border -because those things are inhibitors. At the moment the Russia influence in Abkhazia is great in the political, military and cultural spheres. With such influences it is hard for me to talk of Abkhazian independence when it is not independent. The Abkhazians say they need Russia; it helped and protected them. In the 90s, after the war in which we helped Kosovo, the influence of the West there was not so great as is Russia’s in Abkhazia now. This is because the West lost interest, they gave them some money and left.
- Maybe, in time, Russia will take a similar step back?
- I don’t think that is possible because Russia wants that influence. It is Russia’s sphere of influence. It is stronger there, than, for example, in Armenia and Uzbekistan. Also Russia still needs to have this empire around its borders. Even Russia accepts that it’s not the Soviet Union and that the game has changed; that it’s smaller and not a ‘mega-power’. Russia accepts all these things, but it does not accept the right of countries around its border to choose their own destiny.
- What is the interest of Russia in Abkhazia?
- There is no intrinsic interest of Russia in Abkhazia. Russian influence in Abkhazia is only there because of Georgia. Russia has an interest in control around its borders. It just so happens that the Abkhaz are more pro-Russian and the Georgians are more anti-Russian. But the Russians want to control both of them equally, it doesn’t have an interest in Abkhazia because, in fact, Abkhazia costs Russia money and Russia is not rich. Russian influence is different in every country; it is enormous in Armenia, it’s not very big in Kazakhstan, it’s increasing in Ukraine. So it’s simply a question of levels. In some places they want influence and in some places they want dominance. In Abkhazia it is complete dominance.
- What are the internal problems facing Abkhazia and what part to they play on its legitimacy?
- Abkhazia clearly now needs a better education system, which is not ‘russified’ and a health system which can be ‘russified’ because they need money for it. I think legitimacy is not too much of an issue. Their elections have been tacitly accepted and understood by the West. Clearly Abkhazia has a lot of problems still, but you can see since 2008 some incremental improvements on the ground. The isolation of Abkhazia has led to its poverty; politically and socially, because it is not as if Russia cared about Abkhazia, neither Georgia nor Russia care about Abkhazia. Therefore, Abkhazia has been pulled in different directions by politicians, but it has not actually developed in terms of governments because that is not what Russia or Georgia cared about.
- So are these the only causes of the internal problems?
- The internal problems of Abkhazia are as a result of a number of things: its soviet legacy, Georgian misdemeanours (since its independence Georgia did not properly integrate and provide for Abkhazia in terms of schools and hospitals and government) and the Russian influence again. Georgia could have played the game a lot better back in the 1990s and 2000s. But Georgia’s nationalism and the way it handled Abkhazia has led to 99 % of Abkhazians not wanting to be a part of Georgia. Nobody, not even the most liberal Abkhaz, wants to be a part of Georgia because Georgian lack of interest over the past two decades has led to social poverty.
- Do you think the return of IDP’s is a pressing problem that needs to be solved soon?
- It is a very difficult question indeed. I think that the return of IDP’s will not be solved until the political problems are solved at a higher level, particularly between Georgia and Russia. Unfortunately, there is not much that Abkhazia can do about that for the time being. I think what is more of an issue is whether the economy of Abkhazia can be sustained with a relatively small population. Eventually, in the long term there needs to be a plan, a roadmap of the return of IDP’s from Georgia in order to ensure that the territorial integrity of Abkhazia remains solid because it is not possible to do that whilst you have so many people living in camps and beyond borders. Although it is a human tragedy, I don’t think, it is an immediate problem; the immediate problem is political.
- Many Abkhazians are currently living in Turkey. What do you think are the chances of a rise in islamisation upon their repatriation?
- I’m not sure about the islamisation of Abkhazia. It doesn’t strike me as being a candidate for radical Islam, anyway, not in the same way that Pakistan is. If there is an increasing Islamic influence that is a very different thing from a radical Islamic influence. I don’t think that Turkey is a place which breeds radical Islam in the sense that it exports radical Islam. I don’t really see that particularly as being a problem in Abkhazia. Obviously, in the West, with islamophobia, that does prey on politician minds, but only those who don’t really understand the true facts. There is no proof of any islamisation in Abkhazia.
- What do you think the future holds for Russian, Georgian and Abkhazian relations? Do you see a constructive dialogue being set up between the three parties in the near future?
- I think you have picked out the key partners- Abkhazia, Georgia and Russia. Of course, Georgia doesn’t agree with that, but I do. I think, I would argue that the West could help, but then the Russians don’t agree with that. But ultimately it is one of those things that is going to take time. We are going to be sitting here next year and we will have exactly the same problems. But maybe in 15 years time either Georgia will have become more attractive or Russia will have become more attractive. And there will be, therefore, more certainty on the Abkhaz side, as to which way they want to go, because I don’t think that they are very certain right now. In the long term, it may be that Georgia is a more attractive model than Russia; if there are problems in Russia, if there is no modernization in Russia and it needs to concentrate on other things. So in the very long term, I suppose, that Georgia has a reasonable chance of having a better relationship, although probably not unity, with Abkhazia. Negotiations aren’t going to work because there are no relationships; there are no diplomatic relations between Georgia and Russia. What I’m saying is, it is not negotiations that are going to do it - it will be time and attraction.
Maria Platonova,
London.
