Stephan Meister: "Medvedev's interest in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a reaction to Russian-Georgian war"

Stephan Meister, political expert of Robert Bosh Central and Eastern Europe research center gave an interview on Nagorno-Karabakh to Orkhan Sattarov, the head of VK's European Bureau.

- Herr Meister, I assume you've heard the recent interview of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev with the 'Echo of Moscow' radio. How would you comment on his words 'it's better to carry on with endless fruitless talks than to unleash war', addressed to Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders? Azerbaijan doesn't want to make peace with current status-quo, so the message was perceived rather negatively there.

- Well, on one hand, I take it was a diplomatic figure of speech. Medvedev plays the key role in South Caucasian affairs, especially in the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. He mediated nine rounds of talks between Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents. Medvedev has been demonstrating increased interest in the matter ever since the Russian-Georgian war. I think the principle question here is the following: is Russia interested in final settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict or not? I'm a skeptic here. Medvedev's wording had a double purpose: to provoke and to show Russia's great dedication and concern for the destiny of the peace process, its desire to continue the talks and prevent a war.

I believe that Medvedev's increased interest towards Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a reaction to Russian-Georgian war. Russia feels the need to intensify its participation in political evolutions of the region, or else other players, such as US and EU, Iran or Turkey, will come forward. It is the desire to hold these rivals back and to keep the key position in the South Caucasus' affairs for Russia that makes Medvedev be so active in Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations.

Russia is certainly playing a double game here. On one hand Russia maintains its military base in Armenia and gives the country weapon systems for free or at extremely low prices. On the other hand, Russia supplies Azerbaijan with weapons as well. Therefore Russia deliberately stimulates weapon race in the region but in the same time assumes the role of a peaceful mediator. In my opinion Russia isn't really interested in a final solution to the problem, as if the conflict is settled Russia will lose effective means to exercise influence over the both countries. Armenia would soon become free from Russian influence, Azerbaijan is already politically and economically independent due to its energy connections with Europe, and with Nagorno-Karabakh issue settled it would have no need for Russia's military and political authority. Of course, Russia wouldn't like that to happen so it puts some safeguards on place to prevent the conflict from resolving. And it is in this regard that I understand the above-mentioned statement of Medvedev. Of course, everyone agrees that talks are better than a war, but experts say that this year the risk of a new armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia is really high. Medvedev reacted to this general feeling by showing that Russia is against war. But it s still an element of his double game.

- How high is the probability of a new war in Nagorno-Karabakh? And

how would major powers of the region, Russia in particular, react to

such a development? Would it remain an observer or would it intervene,

like it did in the case of Georgia?

- It's hard to tell whether a new war is possible. Such a conflict has been predicted every year for 15 years, so I would exercise caution while making an expert prognosis on the matter. However, over the past two years we have observed dramatic increases in military budgets of the both countries, and especially Azerbaijani. President Aliyev threatened to go to war more than once if the international community doesn't pay more attention to the problem and settle it once and for all. Border incidents happen more and more frequently.  On the other hand, war isn't in the best interests of either of the states: it would hamper Azerbaijani energy projects, while Armenia isn't prepared for a large-scale campaign and fully depends on Russia in the matter.

And Russia isn't interested in a shooting war. It tries to keep the conflict on a certain level but wouldn't like to be dragged into an armed conflict. In case of war Russia is obliged to help Armenia. And Russia has already learned its lesson in Georgia: it turned out that it's prepared not well enough for such a 'small war', while its international prestige has been seriously damaged.  Yes, a war in Karabakh would have a negative effect on BP's and SOCAR's projects, and that would play in Russia's hand, but still, it is unlikely that Russia is really interested in this war.

The situation, however, is very tense now, and the risk is of a war stirring up is high. 

- And if the war happens, how would Turkey react? Will it unequivocally support Azerbaijan?

- It's also hard to tell. Of course, Turkey is Azerbaijan's principle ally, but in the meantime Turkey tries to become an objective intermediary in the region itself, at least in the eyes of the European community. Turkey would definitely pay linkage to Azerbaijan, but I don't think there's a big chance that it will actually take part in the war. Turkey would also have to heed US and NATO's opinion.

- Turkish-Armenian dialog isn't going so well, especially after recent words of Serge Sarksyan who literally laid claims to several Turkish territories. The Turkish PM demanded apologies, but Armenian President didn't give any response. How do you think, does Turkey really need good relations with Armenia? And why is the US so persistent in the question of opening the border between Turkey and Armenia?

- I think, it has certain advantage for Turkey in a long-term perspective. I'll have to admit, I liked the idea of 'football diplomacy' in 2009. I think the USA made a mistake by pushing Turkey too hard, by insisting on immediate results. A new convention on border regime requires time and patience, and this process is still ongoing, even though some say it came to a halt. Azerbaijan also pressures Turkey threatening to cut its gas supplies to the country in case in signs a treaty with Armenia. The level of inner political pressure in both countries is also very high, and neither Armenian President nor Turkish PM can fight it. Right now the whole situation isn't in favor of a treaty.

Recent words of Sarksyan were meant for Armenian ears. Right now the President is under a great deal of pressure from the opposition, and in particular from ex-president Ter-Petrosyan, who was more apt to compromise. Armenia really needs to open its borders with Turkey. The problem is that the basis of post-Soviet Armenian ideology in the idea of Armenian Karabakh, and the government exploits it to cover up its unsuccessful policy. Apart from Karabakh, economic and social achievements of the regime look pretty poor, so the government needs this 'Karabakh ace' to justify its legitimacy. And that is, as I think, is the main barrier on the way towards successful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. But, as I said, it is possible that Armenian regime will change soon enough as the discontent with the government grows stronger and stronger.

As for the Americans, they want to demonstrate some viable successes in the region, and opening Turkish-Armenian border would be one. And there's always the issue of diversification of Caspian energy transit routes. Conflict with Armenia will always slow down the progress of Turkey in NATO, as Armenian diaspora has strong influence over US Senate. The USA hashed the events to soon, I think they should be more patient.

- Does the idea of Turkish-Armenian reconciliation come from Obama's administration? If Obama won't get re-elected, will the process lose its appeal for the US government?

- Yes, I think this idea comes from Obama's administration. If the Republicans regain power, this process will lose its position on US priorities list. Republicans wouldn't press this regional issue.

Interview by Orkhan Sattarov. Exclusively for VK