Zurab Abashidze is a professional diplomat, Ph.D. in political science. Abashidze was an attache in the USSR consulate-general in Bombay in 1978-1980, later in 1984-1988 he was an aide of the Soviet embassy in Madrid, and during the period 1993-2000 he was Georgian ambassador to the Benelux states, NATO and the EU. In 2000 Zarab Abashizde was appointed ambassador to Russia. He is also an author of studies: "NATO and Georgia: From utopia to reality", "The Cold War Past and Present". Currently he is a prominent public figure.
- Zarab Iraklievich. Then president of Georgia Eduard Shevarnadze appointed you to the post of ambassador to Russia in 2000, when the first signs of tensions in Russian-Georgian relations appeared. Why did he appoint you - an ambassador to NATO and EU? What did this mean in the language of diplomacy?
- Firstly, it was a unified diplomatic mission in Brussels - a joint embassy to the EU and NATO. At the time, Georgia didn't have enough resources to appoint separate ambassadors to NATO, the EU and Benelux. Later, an ambassador to the EU was finally appointed, and I was moved to Moscow. I really don't think this was motivated by some philosophy. Perhaps those who made this decision took into consideration good contacts I had from my student days. Maybe memories about my father (Iraklii Abashidze - a prominent Georgian writer, scholar, and chief editor of the Encyclopedia of Georgia -VK) played some role in this appointment, but I have never thought about this as a manifestation of some specific political line.
- To what extent was the worsening of relations between Russia and Georgia evident in the beginning of the 2000's, which most recently resulted in the war of 2008?
- Until the turn of 1999-2000 we had secured more or less normal relations with Russia, though there were some contradictions on Abkhazia. Relations dramatically worsened during the second Chechen War in the fall of 1999. On the same occasion, the problem of the Pankisi Gorge on the border with Chechnya appeared, through which militants, along with refugees, were leaking into the territory of Russia. Russia called on Georgia to carry out a joint military peration in this region. Georgia, for its part, insisted on resolving this problem on its own, since the arrival of Russian troops could have resulted in another "Chechnya", but on Georgia's own territory. Georgia kept its word and resolved the problem. Today, no one says there are militants in Pankisi. Therefore the events of 2000-2001 have become a dividing line in Russian-Georgian relations, following which the processes have turned into dramatic ones.
- Do you share the opinion, that there are immediate and fundamental contradictions between Russia and Georgia? For example, that Russia is not interested in the existence of the Georgian state, which borders almost the entire North Caucasus?
- I do not agree with the opinion that the existence of Georgia as an independent state is unacceptable for Russia. Though Russia does have its own view on the foreign policy strategy of its neighbour state, and whether it really meets Russia's interests. No one tries to keep it in the dark. Corresponding documents of the Russian Foreign Ministry and other governing institutions can be found on the web. Russia's interests in its neighbouring states are highlighted in these documents. A satisfying example of such relations is the implementation in Kazakhstan, Armenia and Belarus as a joint security and economic area, customs union and so on. Georgia definitely doesn't fit this model of interstate relations.
- Can you say whether any strategic compromise between Russian and Georgian interests is possible?
- At this point it is really hard to make any assumptions, since the contradictions are too deep and the whole process has gone too far. All the more so after the August war and recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The events of August 2008 led our relations into a pitch-dark dead-end. There are no diplomatic relations between our states. Not a single Georgian government will go for rapprochement with Russia or reestablishment of Russian embassy in Tbilisi while there are Russian diplomatic missions in Tshinvali and Sukhumi, since this would mean recognition of their independence and the authority of Moscow's decisions. It would be legitimization of all the things Russia has done in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
On the other hand, it is quite obvious that Russia will never give up its position on this issue. So the situation, in fact, is desperate. At least, I don't know any way to resolve this problem. Meanwhile, the majority of state leaders, and almost the entire international community, consider that Russia has not stood by the Medvedev-Sarkozy-Saakashvili agreement, signed in August 2008, regarding withdrawal of Russian troops to their positions prior to August 7th 2008. We are witnessing a vicious circle, with no way out. Our Russian counterparts offer such a formula: "What happened, has happened. Let's leave contradictions in the past and start relations from a tabula rasa." But for the Georgian side this formula is unacceptable.
- After the August war you have criticized the Georgian authorities several times. Later you participated in the mission of the Georgian Orthodox Church to Russia, which held negotiations in Moscow. Has your opinion changed since then?
- I criticized the policy of the Georgian authorities prior to the events of August 2008. I'm absolutely sure that Georgia has made a range of deceitful mistakes in carrying out its strategy of relations with Moscow. Especially in the two-three years prior to the war's outbreak. But these mistakes do not justify Russian annexation of neighbouring state's territories to any degree. The current hostilities between Russia and Georgia appeared a long time ago, maybe since 1992. It was hardly possible to call Russian policy in Abkhazia and South Ossetia neutral, peaceful and unprejudiced. As for the war itself, the blame of each side in these events was estimated by the EU commission of Taliavini. In general I agree with its conclusions. But during that period Russia has made several more serious blunders, thus the biggest share of the responsibility for that war should be laid on Russia. I formulate it: ?The bigger the state, the greater its responsibility. Mistakes are proportional to the size of the state.
- Do you agree with the opinion that the idea of Georgia joining NATO is a matter of the past?
- The process is not dead but halted. However, August 2008 has complicated and postponed Georgia's entering NATO. I do share the opinion that the West has surrendered Georgia. Yet the West should have made more efforts to prevent the events of August 2008. As regards the present day, some say that both sides should make a trade-off. But I, personally, don't really understand what compromise steps should be made by Georgia. Our country has almost no sources for compromise. For example, some suppose that Georgia should call off the ban on Russia's entering the WTO. But these objections are based on a rule that mutual trade should be exercised through legal border points. Giving up this principle would mean recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia for Georgia, and not just practically, but technically. It would authorize the loss of the territories not only on the bilateral, but on the international level - on the level of powerful global organizations. Not a single Georgian political will ever go there. Some also speak of entering a non-aggression pact. Georgia can make this treaty with Russia. And it can contain security issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia and Georgia were involved in this war, so the pact should be negotiated between these two states.
In general, I can't really understand why separatism in Georgia would meet Russia's interests? This has been a vital element of Russia's policy for many years, and it all started long before 2008. I have no answer to this question.
Interviewed by Georgii Kalatozishvili, Tbilisi.
