Author: Interview by Orkhan Sattarov, head of European office of VK
Professor Bahruz Abdolvand, Coordinator of the Center for Economic and Environmental Studies of the Free University of Berlin, expert on the Middle East region, has expressed his position on the situation in Syria, Uzbekistan's withdrawal from the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the last round of tension in relations between Baku and Ashgabat in the interview to VK.
- Mr. Abdolvand, how do you see the further development of the situation around Syria?
- I do not see any reason for which the major relevant players of the Syrian conflict could change their positions. This means that Russia and Iran will continue to support Bashar al-Assad. Russia does not want to lose its only outpost in the region, the military port of Tartus. For Iran, Syria is also one of the three fronts that he has successfully created over the past decades, namely Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. In fact, for this reason Kofi Annan holds regular talks in Tehran.
The events we are seeing in Syria are not a struggle in which one party acts as a dictator, and another part is all his people. Al-Assad represents the Syrian population groups that are interested in the rise of the Salafis to power in this country. These groups fear that in case of the fall of the al-Assad regime reprisals on the part of the new Sunni government will begin. And these fears are not groundless.
- Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with representatives of the Syrian opposition, including the radical Syrian National Council, last week. At the same time, Moscow has announced that it will not supply new arms to Syria until the stabilization of the situation in this country. Can this be regarded as a sign that Russia is ready to reconsider its policy in Syria?
- No, this is not a sign of a change in policy. Russia is now trying to play the role of "honest broker". Moscow has already had a similar experience during the civil war in Tajikistan. Then Russia actively supported the loyal Rahmon government and organized parallel peace talks together with Iran. The opposition has been integrated into the government of President Rahmon, and later, when the Tajik government consolidated its power, the Islamists were gradually removed from their posts.
Now Moscow will try to repeat the same policy in Syria. Russia is quite clearly supporting al-Assad, but at the same time it provides to the opposition an opportunity to save face and to be integrated into government structures. If the opposition does not allow the integration, Russia can allow the escalation of the conflict increased by one level. There are some signals of it: there are threats to veto the new resolution of the UN Security Council, sending new military ships to the Syrian coast and voting down the sanctions against Syria. By way of summing up, we can say that Russia will not allow itself to lose al-Assad.
- What role may Turkey play in the conflict?
- The Turks made a mistake when they destroyed their relationship with the regime of Bashar al-Assad and supported the armed opposition. As a result of this error, the space for action is very limited for Turkey, because in the Syrian conflict, Turkey actually opposed to two allies of Bashar al-Assad, i. e. to Russia and Iran. Both states are the most important exporters of gas to Turkey and, accordingly, have serious levers of influence on it.
We should not forget also that the Turkish economy is heavily burdened by debt. The total amount of Turkey's public debt is 279.7 billion dollars. At the same time, tourism industry plays an important role in the economy. It can become easy targets for terrorist attacks, which would entail negative consequences for the Turkish economy. In recent years we have seen the revitalization of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. In my opinion, this is not a mere coincidence; it is directly related to the Turkish policy toward Syria. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party does not act independently, and it is influenced by external actors. Therefore, Turkey is not at risk to cross a "red line": an incident with a Turkish fighter jet shot down which was not followed by any meaningful response from Ankara confirms this.
- Uzbekistan's secession from the CSTO provoked large resonance in Russia. What are the consequences it may have for Uzbekistan? And why did Karimov take this step?
- A South Korean company has recently upgraded the Navoi Airport in Uzbekistan. It seems that Uzbekistan wants to give the American military units the right to use this airport for military purposes. But, being a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Uzbekistan need the consent of his partners in the alliance. Since Russia cannot allow this, the Uzbek government decided to take this step and, consequently, to sign a contract with the U.S. side regardless of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. It's a risky decision, because, in its arsenal, Russia has a lot of means in order to sober Uzbekistan. The example of it is the active role of the Russian government in the projects related to water reservoirs in Tajikistan, which can cause a painful blow to the water supply of Uzbekistan. Now Russia is in talks with the Tajik government on acquiring 50% of the Rogun reservoir. This is a pretty clear signal to President Karimov which shows the limits of his field of action.
- Recently, Turkmenistan has sent exploratory ships in the disputed field "Kepez", which caused tensions between Baku and Ashgabat. What are the implications this may have on the Azerbaijani-Turkmen energy cooperation in the context of European energy security?
- The incident occurred after the EU started once again lobbying for the project of the Trans-Caspian pipeline, which should deliver Turkmen gas to Azerbaijan. Russia strongly opposes the project.
This action of Turkmenistan, which caused a reaction in Azerbaijan, threw a shadow on the Trans-Caspian pipeline project. Taking into account that in Turkmenistan such strategic decisions are taken only at the presidential level, it seems that Ashgabat has decided to file a friendly signal to Moscow. This shows that the dialogue with Moscow is inevitable in many energy-political ways. The EU should take this into account.
