Former US ambassador to Azerbaijan and former co-chair of the OSCE Minks Group Mathew Bryza, who is believed to be one of the best Western experts dealing with the South Caucasus, talked to VK about the situation in the region.
- Mr. Bryza, what do you think about the future of the region, are those, who believe that the situation may change for the worse, right?
- I believe the South Caucasus and Caspian regions have tremendous potential for economic growth, provided they can continue working effectively – especially with the United States and NATO -- to stem threats to their stability posed by: (a) Islamist radicalism, aggravated by activists based in Afghanistan and Iran; and (b) liberalize their political systems to unleash the full productive potential of their populations.
Maintaining the balance between stability and liberalization is the key challenge for these countries. Azerbaijan, for example, has a chance to avoid the two extremes former President Hosni Mubarak left for Egypt: either Islamist extremism or political authoritarianism. Striking the balance in Azerbaijan and elsewhere in the region will require continued courage and true commitment to national interests and universal values of human rights, not only by government officials, but by private citizens as well.
I do not view as likely a return to armed conflict in any of the South Caucasus unresolved conflicts. The Georgian Government is working to make reintegration more attractive to the residents of Abkhazia, while South Ossetia has effectively been incorporated into Russia. Regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, I believe renewed armed hostilities would be likely only if the parties fully lost faith in the Minsk Group’s commitment and ability to negotiate a framework agreement as outlined by the “Basic Principles.”
- The United States has intensified its efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, should one expect other steps towards peaceful solution?
- Unfortunately, I do not agree with the premise of this question. I am disappointed by what I see as the United States having significantly decreased its activeness in the South Caucasus. In the case of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, the next step I recommend to Washington is to appoint a full-time envoy to serve as Minsk Group Co-Chair.
Once Washington does appoint a new Minsk Group Co-Chair, it will be important for Secretary of State Kerry and President Obama to provide strong political support to a renewed dialogue between Presidents Aliyev and Sargsian and for any compromise decisions the two South Caucasus Presidents may decide to take in the context of the Minsk Group process. It will also be important for the top U.S. leaders to have Nagorno Karabakh on their agenda for all discussions with their Russian counterparts.
- Can the changes in the Russian-Georgian relations affect the situation in the region? What certain changes should be expected?
- In principle, improved Russian-Georgian relations should benefit the entire South Caucasus. Russia should naturally be one of Georgia’s largest trading partners. There is no reason for the two countries’ trading relations to be disrupted; in fact, during the days when Russian troops were invading Georgia in August 2008, electricity trade between Russia and Georgia continued to flourish.
The Georgian Government has made clear that it will not normalize relations with Russia until the Russia military ends its occupation of Georgian territory in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This is a strong statement by Prime Minister Ivanishvili.
The most important question is whether Prime Minister Ivanishvili will continue to lead Georgia’s quest to become a member of NATO and other Euro-Atlantic institutions, while sustaining Georgia’s crucial role as a bridge between Azerbaijan/Central Asia and Europe. Early in his term, Prime Minister Ivanishvili sent confusing signals suggesting that he might prefer Georgia to emphasized North-South connections, (such as reopening of the rail link from Russia to Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia to Armenia) over East-West connections (such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad).
It seems Prime Minister Ivanishvili has now corrected his course by reaffirming Georgia’s trajectory toward the Euro-Atlantic community. This approach reflects the preferences of Georgian voters, who overwhelmingly favor Georgia’s membership in NATO. It also reflects the unified voice of Georgia’s parliament, as articulated in a statement last March by both the government and opposition factions in parliament reaffirming their support for Georgia’s Western trajectory in its national security policy.
- What Azerbaijan should do in order to pursue the USA and European countries to support Azerbaijan's territorial integrity?
- The United States and its European Allies are indeed interested in the restoration of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. The U.S. has worked intensively and successfully with its NATO ally, France, as well as with Russi all the members of the OSCE’s Minsk Group to formulate a framework for a final settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, known as the “Basic Principles. ” This framework was articulated in the “Madrid Document” of November 2007, as well as in the statement of Presidents Obama, Sarkozy, and Medvedev during the G-8 Summit in D’Aquila, Italy, in July 2009. Finalization of the “Madrid Document” would make a dramatic contribution to Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity by securing Armenia’s agreement to return to Azerbaijan’s control the seven Azerbaijani territories surrounding Nagorno Karabakh in exchange for Nagorno Karabakh receiving an “interim legal status” until a vote occurs at some point in the future on the Azerbaijani region of Nagorno Karabakh’s “final legal status.”
So, the most effective step Azerbaijan could take in this regard would be to resume negotiations at the presidential level to finalize the Basic Principles. And, as I noted above, the U.S.’s top leaders would have an important role to play in supporting such negotiations through public statements, as well as by ensuring mediation of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict remains on the agenda of the U.S. and its European Allies in all major meetings with their Russian counterparts.
Azerbaijan can also help by making clear its readiness to supply Armenia with natural gas and to invest in Armenia’s transportation and communications infrastructure in the context of progress to a settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Such commercial diplomacy will provide Yerevan some breathing space to take the bold decisions required for a breakthrough.
Interview by Fuad Safarov. Exclusively to VK.
Mathew Bryza graduated from Stanford University with a Bachelor of Arts degree in International relations and obtained his Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University in 1988.
Bryza joined the United States Foreign Service in August 1988. He then served in Poland in 1989-1991 at the U.S. Consulate in Poznań and the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw, where he covered the Solidarity movement, reform of Poland’s security services, and regional politics. From 1991 through 1995, he worked on European and Russian affairs at the State Department. Bryza served at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow during 1995-1997.
In April 2001, Bryza joined the United States National Security Council as Director for Europe and Eurasia, with responsibility for coordinating U.S. policy on Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Caspian energy. In June 2005, he assumed duties of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs.
In May 2010, the White House appointed Bryza as the United States Ambassador to Azerbaijan. On September 21, 2010, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved his ambassadorial nomination and sent it to the Senate floor. On December 29, 2010 Bryza's appointment by President Obama was confirmed by the White House as a recess appointment. He served as ambassador to Azerbaijan starting from February 2011.
In January 2012 Bryza left the post and the foreign service as the Senate did not confirm his nomination due to the opposition by Armenian-American lobbying groups who alleged his ties with the Azerbaijani government.
Since March 1, 2012 Bryza has been appointed the Director of the International Centre for Defense Studies, a Tallinn-based think thank. His first marriage ended in divorce. On August 23, 2007, he married Zeyno Baran, from whom he has a daughter. He lives with his family in Istanbul, Turkey.
