Speech delivered by VK editor-in-chief Alexei Vlasov at the round-table ‘New Realities in the South Caucasus Region’ conference held in St. Petersburg
Having made mention of the South Caucasus region at the plenary meeting, I would now like to specify my position concerning Armenian-Turkish rapprochement. Yerevan’s withdrawal from the process of the protocol’s ratification does not signify the end of the negotiation process, but now it is evident that it will be postponed for quite a long period of time. I will not dwell at length on the reasons that led to the implementation of such a scenario. The reasons are rather numerous and most of them are objective by their nature.
It’s a motif of our desires and our capabilities. They do not always coincide at every point. There is no need to panic and announce that the settlement process has been irretrievably lost, because there are no objective prerequisites for making statements of this kind.
Undoubtedly, Turkey has a very difficult year ahead of it. To some extent, Erdogan’s situation is more complicated than Sargsyan’s. The Armenian leader has a distinct minimum program of conditions - the authorities in Yerevan and the Armenian diaspora do not intend to abandon the policy of international recognition and prosecution of the Armenian genocide and nobody will manage to drive a wedge between Armenia and the diaspora concerning the issue of the recognition of the genocide - there is no difference in the opinions of the Armenians living in Armenia and the Armenians of the diaspora, there is the united Armenian people, and they will struggle for justice consistently. Of course, this is the result of pressure exerted by the Armenian diaspora, but it is a principled position. Like it or not, this is how it is.
As for Erdogan, he is faced with constant multidirectional pressure exerted by several external sources. The USA is trying to save face and push for any visible results concerning the protocols. Inside the country the current leadership’s actions are criticized in several
regards. Internal tension in relations with Baku remains. Yet, to all appearances, the Turkish side is trying to retain the topic of Nagorno-Karabakh to whatever extent possible as a key condition for normalization of relations with Yerevan. Judging by statements made by
Turkish officials, Turkey still considers the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict a problem of the Turkic world. “Ankara knows its own mind in the South Caucasus: cessation of the occupation, return of Azerbaijani refugees home and amicable stabilization in the region", is one such
recent statement.
However, the pressure exerted by Washington places Ankara in an extremely disadvantageous situation. The tempo and format of the settlement cannot depend on the will of the State Department, while here we can see an ultimately concentrated desire to solve all the problems within the bounds of a given scheme, despite the fact that in this case the scheme is injurious, not beneficial.
I can fully agree with David Petrosyan. If this political project fails, the U.S. will find itself in a rather difficult situation, in that it will appear that they only " stir up trouble " in the South Caucasus region and are unable to achieve any substantial results. How much room for manoeuvre does the current Turkish leadership have? I think it can be extended through closer cooperation with Moscow, the more so as Russian-Turkish dialogue has developed very dynamically lately. However, Erdogan obviously needs some success, however small, in pursuing foreign policy initiatives. Running in circles cannot last for ever.
Alexei Vlasov
