Between August and December 1991, when consultations between Moscow, Minsk, Kiev and Almaty especially intensified on the future of the former Soviet republics, the Russian authorities had the biggest potential of influence on Kiev for a settlement of the Crimean problem. They had to raise the question firmly before Kiev either ahead of the first presidential elections in Ukraine on December 1st 1991, or ahead of the Belavezha Accords, which were signed on December 8th, as a necessary condition of the painless separation of the two republics. The president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, would agree to the step without enthusiasm, but he would do it, considering the bright prospect of sudden independence from the Kremlin and Moscow would occur at that moment.
Today a popular argument of opponents of Crimea’s merger is that Russia has violated its international guarantees before Ukraine and the norms of international law. Today we have to discuss this, as Ukraine is a real subject of international law and seems to be a developed state, at least before the recent overthrow. However, 25 years ago there were no international standards on this issue, as the dissolution of the Soviet Union couldn’t be described in any external international juridical standards. The Soviet Union was a source of laws itself. Thus, by the moment of its dissolution, everything was settled inside the Union, at the level of the republics, by the last communist elites, considering the reasonability of their interests of preserving power in the period of a dynamic and even violent transit. The legal norms of the USSR’s “turn” into the CIS were developed in favor of them, due to behind-the-scenes deals.
It should be noted that the unfinished scenario on the Crimean issue was considered by the Kremlin as a done deal – a kind of regional “end of history.” They were sure that relations with Ukraine wouldn’t become so much worse that a military conflict would be started or a military threat from Ukraine would be directed against Russia. It was thought that the Ukrainian bureaucracy and the financial-industrial elite were natural and long-time partners of Russia. Putin’s statement is very indicative: “We, in Russia, have always thought that the Russians and the Ukrainians are one nation. I think so even today…”
Before the first Ukrainian ‘orange revolution’ in 2004, Moscow didn’t treat seriously assumptions that the new Ukrainian elite could threaten the Russian part of the socio-economic space of Ukraine by actual destruction. Such ideas by journalists and political scientists seemed to be fantastic. Kiev was trusted, counting that the pragmatism of business, trade and economic relations and a balanced foreign policy could be an infinite constant in our bilateral relations. Even the process of Ukrainization of the educational and administrative and legal spaces couldn’t undermine the trust. The only clear concerns about the Ukrainian direction, which were voiced by Moscow in the period of Yeltsin’s regime, were connected with the expansion of NATO.
At the same time, the opposition and experts pointed out certain risks and tried to convince the Kremlin that radicalization of Kiev against Russia was possible. The Supreme Council of Russia developed possible options of changing Crimea’s status and its gradual return to Russian jurisdiction. They considered options of signing a long-term lease of Crimea with Ukraine. However, at the level of the presidential administration and the Foreign Ministry, the topic was ignored and decisions made by the legislative power were banned at the level of the executive power.
Therefore, the Crimean topic was a subject of confrontations between Yeltsin and Khasbulatov, among other political issues which were the essence of the ‘legendary’ conflict between the Supreme Council of the RF and the first president of Russia. Attempts to leave the Ukrainian jurisdiction by Simferopol itself (when Crimea was headed by Yuri Meshkov) also failed.
Crimea wasn’t returned for several reasons. First of all, the new constituent of the federation could be ‘too heavy’ for Moscow. The economic situation in Russia was worse than in Ukraine in the sphere of food supplies by 1993-1994. Secondly, there was pressure from Caucasus separatism. The return of Crimea could be considered as an imperial remission in the context. The Kremlin was more vulnerable, facing any kind of criticism, at that period than it is today…
The destruction of internal Ukrainian political balances, the sudden collapse and disappearance of Russian partners represented by the Party of Regions, actually made the Kremlin choose the scenario of return. Putin explained this himself in detail.
Technically the process was well-organized. Activities of all structures – from the FSB, the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry to civic ministries and unknown social activists – were coordinated perfectly. It was unusual even for Putin’s Russia on the wave of the success of the Sochi Olympics. However, it proves that it is not about “expansion and raiding”, but the realization of the vital interests of the multinational Russian population, as Crimean residents identify themselves as Russians. Civil movement from both sides was obvious and unexpected for observers from the EU and the USA.
"The Crimean precedent" is the one of the few political events in Russia where you can clearly see the national interest of the citizens of the country. It differs from the corporate, clan, elite and various departmental interests, because you can have a fair national referendum on this issue. The return of Crimea to Russia was supported by an absolute majority - from Chechnya to the outskirts. And Crimeans themselves perceived this event as a correction of a historical injustice. The most difficult question related to the ethno-political positioning of the Crimean Tatars has also been in the focus of Moscow. And the Kremlin relied on the leaders of the Tatar and Caucasian communities in negotiations with individual national autonomy for the first time. The role of Ramzan Kadyrov and Rustam Minnikhanov, the value of their statements and "diplomatic missions", was an extremely important component of the overall work on the return of the Crimea. Despite the high degree of politicization and antagonism towards official Moscow that modern Crimean Tatars demonstrate, as if they are forced to work off the inheritance of the fathers' of deportation period, a dialogue was organized, and, in my opinion, many of their concerns have been taken into account, as far as is possible in Russia, of course.Now about the costs. The main one among them is the cost of this process to the Russian budget. Let's see how much subsidized Crimea will cost in comparison, for example, with the Caucasian modernization programs. Since December 2012, all Caucasus Federal Programs are included in the state program of the Russian Federation "The development of the North Caucasus Federal District up to 2025". The total cost of the state program at the time of its adoption was 2.5 trillion rubles. But 90% of it will be attracted from extra-budgetary sources. The budget will allocate only 235 billion rubles from 2013 to 2020.Thus, the Crimean federal program is the most costly state program of Russia. The only justification for this is that large-scale infrastructure and road upgrading of Crimea, which was alleged by Kiev to have been carried out, practically wasn't implemented - the latest infrastructure and large buildings ended with the collapse of the USSR. The Ukrainian period of private capitalism and Crimean criminal wars was a full decline and degradation in the sense of any major investment and similar activities. Therefore, the integration of Crimea is a great boon for the peninsula. There is a joke on the peninsula that it wasn't Russia that annexed Crimea, but Crimea that annexed Russia.The external geopolitical risks upon the integration of Crimea into Russia were quite high, but not so critical for Russia. The war in Donbass and an even more important event for the global community - the downing of the Boeing - have changed everything. It has reduced the number of Russia's partners in the world and strengthened sanctions. If it were not for these two events, we could think that the return process was almost perfect. But now it's a slightly different story, with a touch of bitterness from the loss of lives in the Civil War in Ukraine."The Crimean precedent" is the one of the few political events in Russia where you can clearly see the national interest of the citizens of the country. It differs from the corporate, clan, elite and various departmental interests, because you can have a fair national referendum on this issue. The return of Crimea to Russia was supported by an absolute majority - from Chechnya to the outskirts. And Crimeans themselves perceived this event as a correction of a historical injustice. The most difficult question related to the ethno-political positioning of the Crimean Tatars has also been in the focus of Moscow. And the Kremlin relied on the leaders of the Tatar and Caucasian communities in negotiations with individual national autonomy for the first time. The role of Ramzan Kadyrov and Rustam Minnikhanov, the value of their statements and "diplomatic missions", was an extremely important component of the overall work on the return of the Crimea. Despite the high degree of politicization and antagonism towards official Moscow that modern Crimean Tatars demonstrate, as if they are forced to work off the inheritance of the fathers' of deportation period, a dialogue was organized, and, in my opinion, many of their concerns have been taken into account, as far as is possible in Russia, of course.
Now about the costs. The main one among them is the cost of this process to the Russian budget. Let's see how much subsidized Crimea will cost in comparison, for example, with the Caucasian modernization programs. Since December 2012, all Caucasus Federal Programs are included in the state program of the Russian Federation "The development of the North Caucasus Federal District up to 2025". The total cost of the state program at the time of its adoption was 2.5 trillion rubles. But 90% of it will be attracted from extra-budgetary sources. The budget will allocate only 235 billion rubles from 2013 to 2020.
Thus, the Crimean federal program is the most costly state program of Russia. The only justification for this is that large-scale infrastructure and road upgrading of Crimea, which was alleged by Kiev to have been carried out, practically wasn't implemented - the latest infrastructure and large buildings ended with the collapse of the USSR. The Ukrainian period of private capitalism and Crimean criminal wars was a full decline and degradation in the sense of any major investment and similar activities. Therefore, the integration of Crimea is a great boon for the peninsula. There is a joke on the peninsula that it wasn't Russia that annexed Crimea, but Crimea that annexed Russia.
The external geopolitical risks upon the integration of Crimea into Russia were quite high, but not so critical for Russia. The war in Donbass and an even more important event for the global community - the downing of the Boeing - have changed everything. It has reduced the number of Russia's partners in the world and strengthened sanctions. If it were not for these two events, we could think that the return process was almost perfect. But now it's a slightly different story, with a touch of bitterness from the loss of lives in the Civil War in Ukraine.
